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ABSTRACT 
After more than two decades of phenomenal economic expansion, 
Botswana now faces the challenge of slowing economic growth, 
rising unemployment and increasing poverty. The minerals sector, 
which dominated economic growth since the late seventies, has 
served the economy well in the past, but social and economic 
developments have reached a juncture where the broad strategic 
direction of the economy needs to be re-evaluated. 
The need to diversify the economy to reduce its reliance on 
mineral commodities has long been acknowledged by government. One 
of the sectors of the economy earmarked for diversification was 
the manufacturing sector. However, in spite of government efforts 
to promote this industry, the sector's contribution to Gross 
Domestic Product(GDP) has remained small and even declined in 
recent years. An investigation into those structural features of 
the economy which are responsible for this record and impose 
limitations on the sectors' future development is therefore of 
great relevance. This study attempts such an investigation by 
focusing mainly on one aspect of the problem: those features 
related to booms in the minerals sector. More specifically, the 
study examines the effect of the real exchange rate and real wage 
rate movements. It also uses case study and survey data to gain 
insight into other major factors responsible for industrial 
development and to corroborate the conclusions reached on the 
basis of macro-economic data. 
The data collected suggest that Botswana has managed its mineral 
windfalls relatively well. It shows that the major effects 
through which mineral windfalls corrode competitiveness of 
industry -- real exchange rate appreciation and real wage rate 
increases have been successfully avoided. It is argued, 
therefore, that the country's industrial backwardness does not 
necessarily arise from booms in the mining sector. This 
conclusion is supported by the firm survey which found that low 
productivity, high utility costs and the lack of skilled labour 
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to be the major impediments to industrial development. 
The study is intended as a contribution to understanding of the 
impact of mineral windfalls on the industrial development process 
in Botswana, but it also offers some policy prescriptions. The 
major policy recommendations that emerge are that wage rate 
increases should be tied to productivity improvements, 
productivity should be raised to international levels through 
training and the exchange rate be managed in such a manner that 
it does not undermine the ability of industry to compete in the 
Southern African Customs Union market. 
Chapter one provides an outline of the Botswana economy, which 
shows the extent of its dependence on mineral commodities, its 
openness, the insignificance of industry, and the past growth 
pattern. It also outlines the research methodology used in the 
study. 
Chapter two briefly makes a case for industrial development 
before reviewing the major theoretical literature on 
industrialization in the presence of booms in the minerals 
commodity sector. It is argued that the need for industrial 
development in Botswana emanates not only from the important role 
that industry plays in development, but also from the risks 
associated with the current economic structure. To gain insight 
into the policy approaches appropriate for sustainable 
industrialization in the presence of mineral booms, the 
experiences of other mineral economies are reviewed. 
Chapter three presents Botswana's experience in relation to the 
above. Using macroeconomic data, it is shown that Botswana's 
industrial development can be divided into three phases, 1966-
1980; 1980-1990 and 1990-95. Growth in the first phase, although 
rapid, was dominated by one industry -- meat and meat processing. 
The second phase, which coincided with booms in the mining 
sector, is characterised by strong growth in employment, output 
and the number of enterprises registered. The 1990s show weak 
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growth at the start of the period, but growth rates improved 
slightly from 1994. However, it is concluded that while the 
strong growth during the boom period of the 1980s can be 
attributed to the windfalls, it is difficult to support the view 
that the slack in the early 1990s was a result of the effects of 
the windfall. This conclusion is further supported by the results 
of a case study/survey(presented in Chapter four) which show that 
the major consequences of mineral windfalls -- the strength of 
currency and high wage rates were not reported as major 
obstacles to the operation of the firms interviewed. 
Chapter five brings together the findings in chapter three and 
four to make conclusions and policy recommendations. It is 
concluded that the boom in the minerals sector is not responsible 
for industrial backwardness in Botswana, at least not through the 
corrosive effects of the Dutch disease. The major constraints 
arise from lack of skills, lack of material inputs at reasonable 
prices, high utility and transport costs, and perhaps the 
countries membership in the Southern African Customs Union. 
However, although the latter could have contributed negatively 
to past industrial development, it now offers a window of 
opportunity for the sector's development. 
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1.1 Introduction 
CHAPTER ONE 
Objectives and Scope of the Study 
I 
I 
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Development economics has long held that industrialization is an 
essential component of development and growth. 1 Despite 
recognizing and endorsing the need for industrialization, 
Botswana still lags behind in manufacturing development. For over 
a decade, Botswana's development has been dominated by minerals, 
with industry contributing as little as six percent of total 
Gross Domestic Product(GDP). This share has been declining since 
independence. However, with growth prospects for the mineral 
sector levelling off, industry will have to take over as the 
engine of sustainable economic growth will increase. 
This paper examines the process of industrialization in Botswana, 
and investigates the structural features of the economy that 
account for the past industrial development record and impose 
limitations on its future expansion. Since evidence from 
international experience demonstrates that small market size and 
booming commodity export sectors are the main impediments to 
industrial development of small primary-resource oriented 
economies, it is reasonable to claim that these two factors have 
retarded the process of industrialization in Botswana. Although 
market size is an important factor, this paper is mainly 
concerned with the effects of the mineral boom. This is because 
the effects of market size are mitigated by Botswana's membership 
of the Southern African Customs Union(SACU), which has a total 
population size of over forty-six million people. However, the 
benefits of SACU membership for industrialization have been 
Industrialization in this study is defined as the 
development of the manufacturing sector. Industry and 
manufacturing will be used interchangeably throughout this paper. 
I 
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questioned, most notably by Selwyn. 2 Nevertheless, the fact that 
goods produced in Botswana have free access to the South African 
market suggests that market size per se is a minor constraint on 
Botswana's industrial development. 
1.2 Background 
• Botswana is a small commodity exporter whose economic growth 
is heavily dependent on mineral exploitation. As table 1.1 shows, 
Botswana has an unusually high mineral dependence index, about 
62. 3 Mining sector's contribution to GDP rose from almost zero 
in 1966 to a peak of 51% in 1983/84 before falling to 35% in 
1994. This mineral growth brought with it phenomenal growth to 
the economy as a whole. GDP grew at an annual average of 14.5 per 
cent during the period 1970-1980; 10.1 per cent during 1980-1990 
and 3.9 per cent during 1991-95. Although such growth was 
recorded off a very low base, about US$36.8 million(l990 prices), 
it was sufficiently rapid to promote Botswana into a category of 
upper middle income countries in terms of its per capita GDP. In 
fact, Botswana has one of the highest per capita incomes in Sub-
Saharan Africa and it owes this distinction primarily to 
exploitation of diamonds. 
2 Selwyn(1975) in his "small country problem", has argued 
that the iQdustrial backwardness of Botswana and the other three 
SACU members was a result of their membership in a Customs Union 
with a large member(South Africa). He argued that the Union led 
to the establishment of a growth pole (South Africa) , which 
discouraged industrial development in the periphery(other 
members, .. ~~<?lud~~-~L~~t:swanaJ_.: 
3 Mineral dependence index is the mean of minerals' share of 
merchandise exports and minerals as a percentage of GDP. 
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Table 1.1 Mineral Dependence Indices of Selected African 
Countries, 1991 
,,, 
Rank Country Minerals as % Minerals as Mineral 
of merchandise % of GDP dependence 
exports index 
1 Nigeria 96.0 38.7 67.3 
2 Botswana 83.0 41.0 62.0 
3 Gabon 89.0 31.2 60.1 
4 Zambia 98.0 18.5 58.3 
5 Congo 92.2 23.6 57.9 
6 Angola 82.1 30.8 56.5 
7 Guinea 82.7 25.0 53.9 
8 Namibia 76.0 29.0 52.5 
9 Niger 86.0 7.6 46.8 
10 Zaire 67.9 16.0 42.0 
11 · South Africa 53.3 9.1 31.2 
12 Mauritania 50.5 11.3 30.9 
13 Cameroon 51.3 9.4 30.4 
Source: Adapted from Davis, 1995. 
• The economy can be described as extremely open. Approximately 
52% of the GDP is exported while the same percentage is imported. 
The total trade/GDP ratio was 103.5 percent in 1993/94. As table 
1.1 shows, about 83 percent of the exports were minerals, the 
bulk of which were diamonds. Botswana is a member of a number of 
trade organizations. It is a member of the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU), the Lome Convention and has a bilateral 
trade agreement with Zimbabwe. Under the Customs Union, goods 
produced within member states can move freely across the borders, 
while a common tariff is placed on all goods imported from 
outside the union. Other members of the union are South 
Africa(40), Lesotho(l.9), Namibia(l.6) and Swaziland(0.9) . 4 The 
bilateral trade arrangement with Zimbabwe(l0.6) allows for trade 
in manufactures which is free of quantitative import or export 
restrictions. and customs duties. Under the Lome Convention 
Botswana's exports enjoy tariff free access to European Economic 
4 Figures in brackets represent population sizes(millions) 
as in 1993. 
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Community(EEC) under a negotiated quota system. It also allows 
limited quantities of specified exports to enter industrialized 
country markets at reduced tariffs. 
• In terms of industrial development, Botswana is still lagging 
behind(see table 1.2). Industrial output in 1994 was a paltry 
P232 million. There were approximately 2,718 manufacturing firms 
in operation in 1994, of which only 700 had total investment of 
over PlOOOO or employed more than four people. Hence, 
manufacturing accounted for only 5 percent of national output. 
Apart from meat-processing and related products and a few other 
manufactures, industry is mainly concerned with minor processing 
of imported materials. 
Table 1.2 Industry's Share in Economic Growth 
1970-1980 1981-1990 1991-1994 
Share of GDP (%) 8 6 6 
Share of Non-mining GDP 10 9 
Share of total employment 6 10 9.8 
Real Growth(Annual average) 16.8 10.9 -2.3 
Source: Central Statistics Office (various issues). 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
It is clear that the manufacturing sector is very small in terms 
of its share of total output and employment. Its growth also, has 
declined in recent years. Given the important role that industry 
has to play Botswana's development, it is essential that the 
causes of this situation are understood so that appropriate 
policies can be formulated to reverse the process. The aims of 
this thesis are, therefore, to: 
1. summarize the record of industrial development in Botswana; 
2. explain and interpret this record in terms of the impact of 
booms in the minerals sector; and 
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3. assess the constraints on manufacturing development and the 
policies required for sustainable industrialization. 
1.4 Research Methodology: Data Collection and Analysis 
1.4.1 Data Collection 
Two main approaches have been used to collect data for this 
study. One approach was library based and provided the data to 
trace patterns and episodes in industrial development and 
interpret them within the broad macroeconomic picture. They help 
answer questions such as, has there been a real exchange rate 
appreciation or wage rate increases? However, data from these 
sources are aggregated in nature and thus do not say much about 
firm-specific problems, such as information on the common 
characteristics of successful exporters or why some firms are not 
into exports. Data on firm-specific problems was obtained by 
means of a survey. 
1.4.1.1 Survey 
The other approach is microeconomic in nature and involved the 
use of a questionnaire. The aim of this approach was to ascertain 
what firms perceive to be the most important factors affecting 
the pace and direction of their development and to establish if 
these views support the picture painted by the aggregate data 
mentioned above. While the sample involved was too small to lend 
itself to statistically significant generalizations, it 
nevertheless provides a deeper understanding of the nature and 
extent of the most common factors affecting the firms 
interviewed. 
Sampling Design and Procedure 
Sampling methods can be divided into two main categories, 
probability and non-probability. The former is superior in that 
it provides a statistical basis for saying that the sample is 
6 
representative of the target population. However, it is not 
always the most appropriate. The choice of sampling method 
depends, inter alia, on the aim of the study and resource 
availability. In this study the non-probability approach was 
considered to be more suitable. The main aim of the selection was 
to ensure that about half the sample were exporters·. This is 
because exporters are most likely to be affected by the exchange 
rate appreciation or high wage rates. Further, the small domestic 
market also dictates that sustainable industrial development can 
only be achieved through exports .. Since time and resources did 
not permit a large sample to be taken, it was probable that the 
sample selected using the probability approach would have 
included very few exporters, if any. Resource constraints also 
dictated that the sample be taken from one geographical area in 
order to minimize travelling time, transport and other costs. The 
probability approach would not have guaranteed this. 
Sampling 
The sample was based on a two stage stratification. First, a 
cluster of firms was conveniently selected. Then a list of all 
firms registered and operating within the cluster was used to 
select the sample. 5 The sampling frame was divided into two. The 
division was based on level of labour employment or total 
investment, whichever was lower was used as the cut-off point. 
Firms with total employment of over 150 or total investment of 
over PS million were categorized as exporters. Ten firms were 
then selected from this group using a simple random procedure. 
Another fifteen firms were selected from the other group using 
the same procedure. Thus, twenty five firms were selected for 
interviews. 
5 The list was obtained from the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry. The list excluded all those firms which employed less 
than four people or had total investment of less than PlO 000 . 
• 
7 
The Questionnaire6 
There are two possible ways by which a questionnaire based survey 
can be conducted. 
1. Questionnaire can be mailed to firms, 
2. Questionnaire can be used as a basis for a telephone or face-
to-face interview. 
Although the former is cheaper and more convenient, it has many 
problems when detailed information is required. People generally 
hate questionnaires, especially when they know that there are no 
direct benefits to be obtained from their participation. Thus, 
they might fill them in hurriedly or give them to their 
subordinates to fill in. It was, therefore, decided that face-to-
face personal interviews were the most appropriate. 
To ensure a high response rate, two letters, one explaining the 
purpose of the study and the other requesting the respondent to 
set a date for an interview, were attached to questionnaires and 
addressed personally to the managing director or general manager 
of the respective firms and delivered to firms. This was followed 
by telephone calls to ensure that the questionnaires reached the 
intended respondents. All the interviews were conducted by the 
researcher using the same questionnaire. The questionnaire was 
first piloted in April 1996 in Gaborone, after which a number of 
changes were made. Respondents were generally managing directors, 
general managers and in one case a financial controller. 
Problems of Survey Method and Reliability of Data 
/!,s already mentioned, the selection procedure for the cluster was 
biased. This was due to a lack of resources. While a more 
geographically dispersed sample would have been more 
representative, it would have spread the resources too thinly and 
thus made it impossible to gain an indepth understanding of the 
6 For a copy of the questionnaire used in the study, see 
Appendix 1. 
• 
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cases studied. The selection of ten firms from an arbitrarily 
chosen group also introduced some bias towards large firms. 
However, this was to ensure that exporters and potential 
exporters were included in the sample. 
All interviews were conducted between January 6 and February 2 
1997, a time when many firms had just reopened after Christmas 
break. Because of this, some of the firms were still busy 
organizing themselves for the year and thus could not be 
interviewed. As a result, only eighteen firms were interviewed. 
1.4.2 Data Analysis 
The choice of the method for analysis depends on the aim of the 
study and on the nature of data collected. In this study, the 
main aim was to gain an understanding of the growth pattern and 
the structural constraints that industry faced as a result of 
booms in the minerals sector. The other aim was to gain an 
understanding of those major factors(not necessarily boom-
related) which dictated the pace and direction of the development 
of firms. 
The study adopts an interpretative 
obtained from both the literature 
interviewed. Statistical data are 
approach to analyze data 
surveyed and the firms 
interpreted to show the 
relationships between episodes in industrial development on the 
one side and policies and changes in variables related to booms 
on the other side. Data from the interviews were also analyzed 
to see if the problems that the firms reported could be linked 
to booms in the minerals sector. 
I 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Economic Structure and Development: Theory and Experience 
2.1 The Case for Industrialization 
The previous chapter has shown that the economy is highly 
dependent on the mining sector, with industry's role almost 
insignificant. It shall be argued that the current economic 
structure creates development problems and should, therefore, be 
diversified. A considerable amount has been written on the 
problems of mineral dependence, the importance of industry and 
the problems of manufacturing development in the presence of 
mineral commodity booms. These issues are the subject of this 
chapter. 
2.1.1 Risks of Mineral Dependence 
Many theories have been advanced to show that reliance on mineral 
commodity exports can be detrimental to sustained development if 
not correctly managed. These theories state that mineral 
economies need to be diversified in order to avoid the dangers 
associated with dependence on commodity exports. 7 
Unequal Exchange 
One of the earliest arguments against reliance on primary goods 
export was put forward by Prebisch and the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Latin America(1950). They argued that, 
the terms of trade for countries producing primary goods will 
continue to fall and thus hamper their economic development. The 
7 There have been counter arguments to the arguments 
presented here, the most recent came from Davis(1995). In his 
article, "Learning to Love the Dutch Disease: Evidence from the 
Mineral Economies", Davies concluded that there is not enough 
evidence to suggest that booming minerals sectors are a 
developmental curse. 
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theory further argues that demand for primary commodities is 
highly sensitive to economic conditions in the consumer 
countries. Thus, reliance on mineral commodities creates 
dependent economies which are highly vulnerable to the vagaries 
of international trade. This argument was supported by Gelb's 
cross country study(l988), which showed that mineral dependent 
countries were prone to wide fluctuations in export prices and 
revenues. In Botswana's case, where the economy depends on just 
one commodity, this problem will certainly be exacerbated. 
Staple or Export Base Theory 
One of the theories in favour of primary export-led growth, the 
export base or staple theory, argues that expansion of a primary 
export can lead to a diversified growth through economic 
linkages. The theory identifies four linkages through which the 
expansion of the export sector spreads to other sectors and these 
are: 
• backward linkages - establishment of firms to provide inputs 
to the export staple; 
• forward linkages - establishment of firms to process the staple 
product before it is exported; 
• fiscal linkages - spending of government tax revenues levied 
on the staple and, 
• final demand linkages - activities set up in response to the 
local spending of wages and profits by labour and owners. 
, 
However, according to the World Bank(l979), extension of the 
staple theory to the minerals sector has shown that mining has 
relatively few production and consumption linkages with the rest 
of the economy. As a result, the benefits of booms in the sector 
are not easily spread throughout the economy. This is because 
mining is by nature capital and skill intensive and thus requires 
inputs that are not abundant in developing countries. In 
addition, some mineral commodities do not lend themselves to 
processing in less developed countries. In Botswana, diamond 
mining is both capital and skill intensive and as such does not 
11 
impact much on employment. Further, contractual agreements 
between Botswana and the Central Selling Organization are that 
diamonds from the former should be sold to the latter in a rough 
form. Therefore, there are no forward linkages in the diamonds 
sector. 
Nevertheless, the minerals sector does show strong fiscal 
linkages with the economy. The problem with this form of linkage 
is that, it depends on the ability of governments to tax the 
profits and how such monies are absorbed. Evidence from 
international experience demonstrates that many governments have 
had difficulties with the absorption of mineral rents(Auty, 1993; 
Gelb, 1988). 
Resource Curse.Thesis 
The resource curse thesis is akin to one of the most popular 
theories of mineral-led development, the "Dutch disease", which 
is reviewed in section 2.2.1. According to this thesis, mineral 
economies can perform worse than they would if there were no 
minerals(Auty, 1993; 1995). This arises when the negative effects 
of boom-related spending more than off set the growth that has 
been brought about by the windfall. 
Although researchers do not agree on whether mineral booms hinder 
or further economic development, arguments against excessive 
reliance on minerals are compelling, especially when the 
exhaustible nature of mineral resources is taken into 
consideration. Mineral deposits are limited in quantity and thus 
any mineral dependent economy will at some point have to contend 
with being without them. This situation poses a higher level of 
risk for an economy that depends on one mineral commodity, such 
as Botswana. Such a development would create tremendous problems 
for the economy unless remedial action is taken well in advance. 
This suggests that "the mineral sector should be regarded as a 
bonus with which to promote competitive economic diversification 
rather than as the backbone of the economy" (Auty, 1993: 10). 
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2.1.2 Significance of Manufacturing Sector 
The conclusion that emerged from the previous section is that, 
dependence on mineral economies can be risky and thus economies 
should be diversified. Attention is now focused on the sector 
towards which the economy should be diversified - industry. 
Industrialization has historically been the central feature of 
development. Prebisch's(1950) arguments were extremely 
influential in making industrialization a key concern of 
developing countries. Chenery et al (1986) argued that there is 
no alternative route to structural transformation that economic 
development entails. Recent literature on 
industrialization(Chenery et al, 1986; Lall, 1992) seems to have 
settled on the following points as the characteristics that make 
industry important to economic development: 
• The income elasticity for manufactured goods is relatively 
high. That is, as income rises, demand for manufactures rises 
more than proportionately. Thus, if a country does not 
industrialize, it runs the risk of balance of payments problems 
arising from an increase in imports as its income increases; 
• Manufactures are highly tradable. This suggests that 
industrialization permits a country to enjoy economies of scale 
arising from serving a large international market; 
• The establishment of industries in accordance with comparative 
advantage permits the reallocation of capital and labour to more 
productive uses and exploits potential gains from specialization 
and economies of scale; 
• Manufacturing growth is one of the main sources of 
technological change. 
Even the World Bank's(1981) Berg Report which was critical of the 
excessive emphasis which some African countries placed on 
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industrialization argued nonetheless that: 
Industrialization has a crucial role in long term 
development; it is one of the best training grounds 
for skill development; it is an important source of 
structural diversification and it can increase the 
flexibility of the economy and reduce dependence on 
external forces. Industrialization also provides 
employment, foreign exchange and domestic savings(p. 
91) . 
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Perhaps these arguments apply even more forcefully to Botswana 
because of its excessive reliance on a single export commodity 
and poor agricultural resources. Thus, if Botswana is to develop 
further, it needs to change the structure of the economy and 
di versify into manufacturing. This has been accepted by the 
Botswana government, which since 1982 has emphasised in each 
Budget Speech that the manufacturing sector should be developed 
to take over as the engine of growth when the mining sector loses 
momentum. 
However, industrialization does not take place in a vacuum and 
as such, cannot be seen in isolation from other sectors of the 
economy. Developments in other sectors can promote or hinder 
development of industry. The next section discusses the problems 
of industrialization in the presence of a booming minerals 
sector. 
2.2 Mineral Economies and Industrialization 
Mineral economies, as defined by Davies(l995), are those 
developing economies which generate at least 40 percent of their 
exports and 10 percent of their GDP from minerals. Figures for 
Botswana were 83 and 41, respectively in 1991, and thus put the 
country in the category of extreme cases of mineral dependence. 
Although these economies provide advantages of extra foreign 
exchange and additional government revenue from mineral exports, 
together with an added industrialization option from the 
processing of minerals, recent studies show that mineral 
economies have hardly outperformed non-mineral economies(Auty, 
14 
1993; 1995 and Gelb, 1988). The problem arises mainly from the 
management of the booms, which has proved difficult for many 
governments. 
2.2.1 The Dutch Disease 
Mineral windfalls can give rise to an economic situation referred 
to as the Dutch disease. The term "Dutch disease" denotes the 
coexistence of booming and lagging sectors in an economy due to 
an increase in export earnings. This phenomenon arises when a 
boom in say, the minerals sector leads to real exchange rate 
appreciation, which in turn damages growth of output of other 
tradable sectors, and when resources, in anticipation of higher 
returns, move from the latter to the former. For one to 
understand how this happens, a definition of the real exchange 
rate is necessary. The real exchange rate is defined as; 
RER = R0 (Pn/P1) , 
where, RER is an index of the real exchange rate, R0 is an index 
of the official (nominal) exchange rate, Pn is an index of 
domestic prices(non-tradable goods) and P1 is an index of prices 
in world trade(tradable goods). Increases in mineral exports can 
cause the real exchange rate to appreciate either by raising R0 
or (Pn/P1) • For instance, higher export earnings cause a surplus 
of foreign currency, which in turn lowers its price in domestic 
currency. This will raise the nominal exchange rate (R0 ) • If 
( Pn/P1) is held constant, then the real exchange rate will 
appreciate. Similarly, additional income from mineral windfalls 
boosts demand for both tradable and non-tradable goods. However, 
since the price for traded goods(P1) is determined in the world 
market, it will remain constant, while 
goods ( Pn) rises (see spending ef feet) . 
that 
If 
for non-traded 
there is no 
intervention, the real exchange rate will appreciate and thus, 
undermine the ability of domestic tractable goods to compete with 
imports. An explanation of how this happens is provided in the 
next sub-section, using the Corden-Neary ( 1982) small open economy 
model. 
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Corden and Neary(l982) traced the corrosive impact of mineral 
windfalls on the economy to be a result of two effects: the 
spending and resource movement effect. 
A resource movement ef feet occurs where a boom in the mining 
sector raises the marginal products of the mobile factors 
employed in that sector and thus attracts resources from the 
manufacturing sector, resulting in de-industrialization. For 
instance, an increase in the world price of minerals will raise 
returns to capital(profits) and labour(salaries and wages) in 
that sector. This will attract those resources away from the 
manufacturing sector. The movement of labour and capital from the 
manufacturing sector will result in a reduction in the sector's 
output. This effect will be large if there is perfect factor 
mobility. Wage and salary increases in the boom sector can also 
lead to wage increases in manufacturing as firms attempt to 
retain workers by offering wages equivalent to those in the 
mining sector. This, in turn increases the costs of production 
and thus further undermines industry's competitiveness. 
However, in reality the extent to which factors can be moved from 
one sector to another is limited. For instance, certain skills 
and machines are sector-specific and will thus remain in certain 
sectors, irrespective of their returns elsewhere. Further, the 
booming sector, such as the diamond industry in Botswana, may use 
relatively few resources that can be drawn from other sectors. 
In Botswana, most of the financing for the mining investments 
came from outside the country. For instance, all financing for 
the Orapa and Letlhakane mines and the related township were 
provided by South African-based De Beers Consolidated Mines. The 
government's major participation in the diamond investment was 
only in the development of the Jwaneng mine, where it took a 20 
percent equity share of the total P280 million capital 
costs(Harvey and Lewis, 1990). The ·mining industry also accounts 
for a relatively small share of national employment(see figure 
2.1). Therefore, it can be argued that the sector did not attract 
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significant resources from the manufacturing sector. In 
situations like this, the resource movement effect will be 
negligible and the major effect of the boom will have to come 
from the spending effect. 
Figure 2.1 Formal Employment by sector, 1994 
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A spending effect occurs where a boom in the minerals sector 
raises wages, salaries, profits and government tax revenue, which 
in turn raise domestic demand for both traded and non-traded 
goods. Since the price of tradable goods is determined in the 
world market, it will not rise, while that of non-tradable goods 
will rise in response(non-traded goods are assumed to be normal 
goods in aggregate). That is, prices of construction, transport, 
labour, services and other non-traded goods will rise while that 
for output remains constant. In this way the real exchange rate 
will be overvalued. This implies that producers of traded goods 
face rising prices for their purchases of non-traded goods and 
services but cannot charge higher prices for their output. This 
will squeeze their profits and as a result some will cut 
employment and output or even close down. 
The increased prices in the non-traded sector can also lead to 
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a further contraction of the manufacturing sector through the 
resource movement effect. For example, if the non-traded sector 
is construction, an increase in the price of buildings (from 
increased domestic demand) will raise returns to labour and 
capital in that sector and attract these resources away from the 
already uncompetitive manufacturing sector, thus weakening it 
further. 
The Model 
The Corden-Neary(l982) models adopt a framework of a small open 
economy producing two traded commodities, minerals and 
manufactures and one non-traded good, services. This paper 
considers only one model: where each of the sectors uses two 
factors, one of which is specific to that sector and the 
other, labour, being perfectly mobile between sectors. 
The model assumes that all goods are used for final consumption 
and not as inputs. There is no taxation of commodity gains and 
international capital is not mobile. The model also ignores 
monetary considerations and concentrates on real variables. 
Therefore, R0 in the equation above is a constant. The prices of 
traded goods are assumed given while those for services are 
flexible. Thus, the real exchange rate varies with the price of 
non-traded goods such that an increase in the price of non-traded 
goods will lead to real exchange rate appreciation. Real exchange 
rate appreciation in turn undermines the ability of local 
manufacturers to compete with imports. 
Figures 2.2 and 2.3(adapted from Corden and Neary, 1982) are 
presented below to illustrate the effects of the boom on the 
labour and commodity markets, respectively. The pre-boom 
equilibria are attained at points A and a. The effects of the 
boom are traced separately the using resource movement effect and 
the spending effect. 
Let 1. L represent labour demand and T, M and S represent 
I 
I 
~ 
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total traded(manufacturing and mining)~ manufacturing and 
service sectors, respectively, so that LT, LM and Ls will 
represent labour demand schedules in the three sectors. 
2. TS represent the pre-boom production possibility 
curve(PPC). 
Resource movement effect(RME) 
The model assumes that the source of a boom is a Hicks-neutral 
technological improvement in the mining sector. The booming 
sector labour demand schedule shifts upwards by an amount 
proportional to the extent of the technological progress: This 
causes the composite labour demand schedule LTf in figure 2.2, to 
shift to L'T and the new equilibrium will be obtained at B. At a 
constant real exchange rate, the wage rate is pushed to w1 , and 
thus causes labour to move out of both manufacturing and services 
sectors. Manufacturing employment falls from OTM to OTM'. In this 
way direct de-industrialization occurs. On the commodity 
market (figure 2. 3), the boom raises maximum output of traded 
goods, while output of services remains the same. The production 
possibility curve therefore shifts to T'S. The resource movement 
effect is represented by the movement of production from point 
a to b. This implies that the movement of labour from services 
and manufacturing to mining led to a fall in output of services 
and an increase in production of tradable goods. 
Abstracting from the spending effect, the income elasticity of 
demand for services is assumed to be zero. This implies that the 
income consumption curve is a vertical line that goes through 
point a and intersects T'S at j. At the initial exchange rate, 
there will be excess demand(OS0 -0S1 ) for services at point j. To 
restore equilibrium, the real exchange rate appreciates and thus 
partially ameliorates the resource movement effect. Therefore, 
the final point lies between band j, implying a lower output of 
services than at the initial equilibrium. 
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Figure 2.2: Effects of the Boom on the Labour Market 
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Spending Effect(SE) 
Abstracting from the resource movement effect, a booming sector 
is assumed to be an enclave. That is, it does not use any labour. 
At the initial real exchange rate, the boom displaces the PPC in 
figure 2. 3 vertically upwards so that production will be at point 
j. There is no effect on figure 2.2 as the booming sector does 
not use any labour. If services are assumed to be normal goods (in 
the aggregate), then the income consumption curve(ICC) will be 
On, intersecting T'S at c. At the initial exchange rate, there 
will be excess demand for services (OS2 -0S0 ) at c. The real 
exchange rate will therefore appreciate to restore equilibrium. 
The new equilibrium will be obtained at a point somewhere between 
c and j, say g, implying that output of services definitely 
rises. Going back to figure 2.2, a rise in the price of services 
will shift the labour demand schedule for services to L's and it 
will intersect the tradable sector demand for labour schedule at 
point G, which will be the final equilibrium. As a result, wages 
rise further to wi, and in turn reduce manufacturing employment 
from OTM' to OTM". As employment falls, so will the sector's 
output. Thus the boom leads to indirect de-industrialization as 
well. 
To find the total effect of the boom, the two separate effects 
are combined. The following conclusions are reached: 
1. Both effects induce real exchange rate appreciation; the final 
point is g, a higher relative price of services than at the 
initial equilibrium at a. 
2. Direct and indirect de-industrialization occur in the lagging 
tradable goods sector so that output and employment unambiguously 
fall. 
Using the above analysis, Carden and Neary(l982) show that, de-
industrialization, defined as a fall in employment and output in 
manufacturing, unambiguously occurs as a result of a boom in the 
minerals sector. The inevitable implication is that for a mineral 
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economy to industrialize, it will have to contend with the task 
of mitigating the effects of the Dutch disease. The question that 
can be asked at this juncture is how can de-industrialization be 
avoided? 
In reality, governments are the major recipients of mineral 
windfalls and thus their spending policies have profound effects 
on the real exchange rate. Governments can, therefore, spend the 
revenues in such a way that they do not cause the real exchange 
rate to appreciate. The nominal exchange rate(R0 ) also, can be 
devalued to enable local products to compete with imports. 
Governments can also use income policies to hold down the price 
of labour and thus limit the resource movement effect. Another 
option is to subsidize industry. 
The next section reviews how booms in commodity exports affected 
industrial development in other mineral economies. 
2.3 Other Countries' Experiences 
A number of recent studies have showed that mineral windfalls led 
to rapid and sustained industrial growth in some economies, while 
in others it resulted in contraction (Gelb et al, i988; Auty 
1993) . The main difference in performance comes from the windfall 
absorption policies adopted by individual countries. Those 
countries that tended to spend their increased mineral revenues 
too fast performed badly, while prudent spenders performed 
exceptionally well. 
2 . 3 .1 Nigeria8 
In the early seventies the Nigerian economy, just like that of 
Botswana, was dominated by agriculture, which accounted for 
8 Based on Bienen, "Nigeria: From Windfall Gains to Welfare 
Losses?" in Oil windfalls, Blessing or Curse?, Gelb et al 1988, 
p. 227-260. 
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approximately 40 percent of non-oil GDP and 42 percent of 
commodity exports, and employed roughly 70 percent of the work 
force. This state of affairs was, however, to change after the 
oil embargo and the emergence of OPEC as an effective cartel, 
which led to large increases in the price of petroleum. 
By the late seventies, the minerals share of GDP was more than 
25 percent. Petroleum exports rose to well over 90 percent of 
total exports in 1979, and accounted for four-fifths of total 
government revenue. At the same time non-oil exports collapsed 
and the relative size of the agricultural sector declined 
sharply. The industrial sector did not fare any better. Economic 
growth slowed from 9 percent before the boom to an average of 2. 5 
percent during the 1974-84 period. This was due to the Nigerian 
government spending windfalls too quickly and resulting in real 
exchange rate appreciation. Nigeria is today cited as a good 
example of an economy suffering from Dutch disease(Auty, 1995). 
This situation arose from the way the Nigerian government spent 
its oil windfalls. When the price of petroleum rose sharply in 
1973-74, the government's oil revenues increased almost five 
times. The government found itself with more revenue than it had 
anticipated. Instead of saving part of the surplus as foreign 
reserves, the Nigerian government appears to have been too eager 
to spend all the gains. For instance, public investment rose from 
about 4 percent of GDP in 1970 to 30 percent 1976. Most of this 
spending was on primary education and roads, which necessarily 
meant that related recurrent expenditure had to rise rapidly as 
well. The average pay of civil servants also doubled in 1975. The 
government invested heavily in inefficient resource based 
manufacturing industries, which were protected from competition 
by tariffs and some direct controls. 
These fiscal excesses were financed by drawing down on the 
reserves accumulated earlier and by expanding the money supply. 
The result was upward pressure on prices. With the nominal 
exchange rate fixed, the real exchange rate appreciated 
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considerably. By 1984, the real exchange rate had appreciated by 
almost three times its 1970-72 level, thus making the tradable 
sector(other than the oil sector) uncompetitive. The result was 
a fall in non-oil exports by about 90 percent during the 1974-84 
period. In the non-mining sector, GDP swung more to the non-
traded sector and the growth rate dropped to 60 percent of the 
pre-boom rate - a sign of Dutch disease. 
The experience of Nigeria provides some important lessons for 
Botswana. Too rapid expenditure of mineral windfalls led to a 
real appreciation of the exchange rate which in turn made the 
manufacturing sector uncompetitive. Resource-based industries, 
which were established through government subsidies, were 
inefficient and their survival depended on government protection. 
The real exchange rate appreciation also made those industries 
with export potential uncompetitive internationally. Increases 
in salaries also increased production costs and stifled 
industrial development. 
2.3.2 Zambia 
Just like Botswana today, Zambia at independence in 1964 had one 
of the highest per capita incomes in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and 
it too owed that distinction primarily to the mining sector. 
However, Zambia has today slipped to the bottom of the scale and 
this situation can be put down to the windfall absorption 
policies of the government, which tended to ignore effective 
diversification. Although the Zambian government was aware of the 
risks of excessive reliance on copper and consequently attempted 
to diversify to manufacturing, it was difficult for the sector 
to develop because the environment was not conducive to 
sustainable industrialization. 
In addition to real exchange rate appreciation, which resulted 
from rapid windfall spending, Zambian industry faced two other 
problems. Firstly, government increased wages and salaries of 
urban workers ahead of productivity improvements. This undermined 
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industry's competitiveness. Secondly, the government transferred 
large sections of industry into the public sector(Auty, 1993). 
This tended to undermine the efficiency of the sector as managers 
were appointed on the basis of political inclinations, rather 
than qualifications(Galhuti, 1989). To ensure survival of these 
inefficient enterprises, government erected high protective 
walls. 
Although manufacturing grew strongly in the first decade after 
independence, the weakness of the approach showed when the copper 
prices fell in the mid seventies. Foreign exchange shortages 
created problems for the large scale import-dependent firms that 
dominated the industry. Their situation was exacerbated by a 
depreciation in the real exchange rate in 1974-78. As a result, 
industrial output started to fall. 
The lessons learnt from the Nigerian experience apply here as 
well. That is, the government should suppress the effect of the 
boom through prudent macroeconomic policies rather than try to 
protect industry through erection of trade barriers. 
2.3.3 Papua New Guinea(PNG) 
Auty(1993: 219) concluded that, "PNG confirms that even a well-
managed mineral economy will under-perform if it neglects its 
non-mining tradable goods." Unlike Nigeria and Zambia, PNG has 
a reputation for soundly orthodox macroeconomic policy, shrewd 
management of its mining sector and a minimalist industrial 
policy. However, despite its good minerals and macroeconomic 
management record, PNG's GDP growth rate fell from an average of 
6.5 percent during 1967-73 to 2.1 during 1973-88. The 
manufacturing sector also has remained extremely weak(ibid. p 
203). This was because of high wages and an overvalued currency. 
The experience of PNG demonstrates that getting the environment 
right through sound macroeconomic policy alone, is not enough to 
pave the way for successful industrialization. There is a need 
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to support the sector through other policies, especially when the 
domestic market is too small to offer any economies of scale. 
2 . 3 . 4 :rndonesia9 
In 1974, Indonesia was the most populous and poorest of all the 
countries that benefitted from oil windfalls. However, unlike in 
Nigeria, Zambia and PNG, the windfalls led to rapid economic 
growth and industrial development. This was because of a 
combination of prudent macroeconomic management and substantial 
support to industry. 
The 1973-74 oil boom raised oil contribution to 16 percent of 
non-mining GDP, while the 1979-80 boom raised it to 23 percent. 
As was the case in Nigeria and Zambia, the government chose to 
spend most of the initial windfall on public investment. The 
result was a real exchange rate appreciation of about 33 percent. 
Thus, the initial impact was similar to that experienced in 
Nigeria, Zambia and other mineral economies. However, the final 
outcome was significantly different from that of other mineral 
economies. Indonesia stood out as a country that maintained high 
non-oil growth rates during the boom. 
As mentioned earlier, successful management of windfalls depends 
on the absorption policies adopted. Indonesia maintained 
macroeconomic balance throughout the boom and devalued its 
exchange rate to avoid real exchange rate appreciation. The 
exchange rate was devalued in 1978, 1983 and 1986, after which 
it was managed flexibly. The government also maintained foreign 
exchange reserves - about $5 billion in 1980. Unlike in Nigeria, 
Indonesia exercised stringent management of the money supply. 
These restraints restricted the impact of oil windfalls on 
inflation. Thus the macroeconomic environment encouraged the 
expansion of non-oil production. The availability of a large 
9 Based on Bruce Glassburner, "Indonesia: Windfalls in a 
Poor Rural Economy," in Oil Windfalls, Blessing or Curse?, Gelb 
et al 1988, p. 197-226. 
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labour surplus in the agricultural sector also helped to keep 
real wages down. 
Indonesia, like Nigeria, followed a strategy of diversifying into 
resource-based industrial (RBI) investments as an alternative 
source of foreign exchange. As was the case in other mineral 
economies, manufacturing production was generally oriented 
towards the domestic market and was frequently given high levels 
of protection. However, unlike in Nigeria, RBI financing had 
significant foreign equity. They were also protected from 
downturns in markets by forward contracts with some countries. 
As a result, Indonesian RBI's were relatively successful. 
Indonesian manufacturing exports also showed rapid expansion in 
general. For instance, in the year after the 1978 devaluation, 
manufactured exports(39 six-digit categories of Brussels Tariff 
Nomenclature) rose by 260 percent. The same happened with exports 
of miscellaneous manufactures after the 1983 devaluation. This 
contrasts with the Zambian situation, where the manufacturing 
sector was too weak to respond to devaluations in 1974. In 
Indonesia the windfall absorption policies of the government had 
not weakened industry, instead they had helped build industrial 
capacity. 
The experience of Indonesia shows that rapid industrialization 
in mineral economies is possible. However, although Botswana can 
copy the approach followed by Indonesia, there are fundamental 
differences between the two countries that make the latter's 
experience not wholly applicable to Botswana. Firstly, Botswana 
is very small relative to Indonesia. This. means that it cannot 
enjoy the economies of scale that apply to Indonesia. Secondly, 
Botswana cannot establish RBI' s to process products of the 
booming sector because of its agreement with the Central Selling 
Organization(CSO) to sell all its rough diamonds to the cartel. 
In any event, even if it were to cancel the contract, there will 
not be much value added from the processing of the stones. 
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However, the experience of Indonesia shows that the Dutch disease 
can be ayoided by the use of prudent macroeconomic policies. 
2.3.S Conclusion 
The experiences of the countries reviewed are in line with the 
theory of the Dutch disease. They show that mineral booms can 
undermine industrial development if not well managed. Prudent 
macroeconomic management alone was shown to be a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for sustainable industrialization. 
Selective support was a further requirement. Subsidizing other 
tradable sectors protects them from the damage that the boom will 
otherwise have on them. But protecting state run industries has 
been shown to be an uneconomic way of protecting industry from 
the effects of the booming sector as state-owned industries tend 
to be inefficient. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Industrial Development in Botswana 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter traces the patterns and episodes in industrial 
development and investigates their relationships with boom-
related events in the economy. 
Industrial development in Botswana, just like in Nigeria, Zambia 
and PNG·, has remained limited, contributing approximately six 
percent to GDP. Its share of national employment was also small, 
just over nine percent in 1994. However, sectoral data show that 
there were periods of significant growth in industry(see table 
3.1). The number of manufacturing enterprises increased from 6 
in 1966 to 2,718 in 1994. Manufacturing output rose from 
approximately P2 million to over P232 million during the same 
period, while the number of people employed in the sector rose 
from 2000 in 1966 to 26,000 in 1990 before falling to 21700 in 
1994. 
Table 3.1: Selected Economic Indicators (at constant 1985/86 prices) 
1981Y81 1981182 1982183 1983/8-4 1984185 1985186 1986187 1987188 1988189 1989190 1990/91 199,192 1992/93 1993194 
GDP Pmn 1511 1624 1864 2101 2252 2421 2636 3038 3634 3955 4255 4210 4196 4366 
GDP growth (% p.a) 9.5 7.4 16 11.5 7.2 7.5 8.9 15.3 13.1 5.7 a.a 6.5 1.8 4.1 
Manufacturing sector 
Output Pmn 100.6 125.6 115.4 119.9 95.5 124.2 146.4 190.1 200.4 210 223.8 238.2 235.8 232.7 
Growth (% p.a) 25 25 -8 4 ·20 30 18 30 5 5 6 6 -1 ·1 
Share of GDP (%) a a 6 6 4 5 6 6 1j 6 6 6 6 5 
Share of non-miming GDP(%) 10 13 12 12 a 10 10 11 10 10 9 9 9 a 
Employment level 6000 6800 8500 9500 10100 10600 12900 15300 18100 23300 26000 25500 22100 21700 
Growth: (% p.a) a 13 25 12 6 6 22 19 18 29 12 -2 -13 -2 
Productivity: output/employee (Pula) 16767 18470 13576 12621 9455 11717 11349 12425 11072 9013 8608 9341 10670 10724 
Source: Statistical Bulletin (1992 & 1995) 
Although this was an impressive performance, the experiences of 
other mineral economies studied in chapter two show that other 
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countries; such as Zambia, went through a period of rapid 
manufacturing growth as well. Therefore, this could suggest that 
a period of rapid growth is a normal transitional stage that 
industry in mineral economies has to go through before bowing 
down to the corrosive effects of the boom. This is why it is 
important to investigate the sources of this spectacular growth. 
3.2 Pattern/Phases of Industrial Development 
There are three phases that can be identified in the growth of 
the manufacturing sector in Botswana. Each of these periods has 
different characteristics. The first period extends from 1966 to 
1980 when the manufacturing sector received low priority and was 
dominated by meat-processing and related industries. The second 
phase extends from 1980 to 1990, when subsidies and other forms 
of assistance were introduced. During this period, there was a 
fairly rapid growth in the number of enterprises registered, 
output and employment. The third phase began in 1991 and has been 
characterised by slow and negative growth rates, both in output 
• and employment . 
• 
3.2.1 Phase I: 1966-1980 
As already mentioned in chapter two, there were hardly any 
industries at independence. However, the number of manufacturing 
enterprises increased from 6 in 1966 to 19 in 1970(Chipasula and 
Mi ti, 1989). By 1980, the number of licensed industries in 
operation in the country had increased to 84. Apart from the 
Botswana Meat Commission, which processed meat and meat products 
for export, most of the concerns were relatively small and served 
the domestic market. Decaux and Tiller(l980) ,w pointed out that 
these enterprises were constantly beset by problems of 
inefficiency and poor working conditions and most of them went 
out of business after a few years of operation. This 
notwithstanding, non-BMC manufacturing grew very fast from the 
w Quoted in Chipasula and Miti 1989. 
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mid-1970s. For instance, in 1979/80 non-BMC manufacturing 
accounted for 4.1% of non-mining GDP, having increased from 1.4% 
in 1971/72. Textiles were the main exports and increased from 
Rl.5 million in 1973 to over R15 million in 1980. 11 
3.2.2 Phase II: The 1980s 
The 1980s witnessed fairly rapid growth in the manufacturing 
sector, with an annual growth rate of around 10.9 per cent, most 
of which occurred between 1986 and 1990. Manufacturing employment 
also increased from 6000 at the beginning of the decade to 26000 
in 1990 - an annual average growth rate of approximate_ly 16 
percent. The sector also underwent a major transformation over 
the 1980 decade, becoming more diversified in structure. Recall 
that, at independence in 1966, the sector was dominated by the 
Botswana Meat Commission, a state owned monopoly, which accounted 
for 95% of total manufactured value added(MVA). By 1984, BMC's 
dominant position had been much reduced, and meat and meat 
products accounted for about 33% of MVA. Thus, manufacturing 
production became diversified. 
An analysis of the sources of growth of manufacturing value added 
for the period 1975 and 1985 was carried out by Lewis and 
Sharpley (1988) . They found that about 51% of the growth came 
from rising domestic demand, 26% from import substitution, and 
24% from exports. When meat and meat products were excluded, the 
shares were domestic demand 54%, import substitution 38%, and 
exports accounted for only 8%. Thus, apart from meat and meat 
products, manufacturing growth was largely led by sales in the 
domestic market (due to import substitution and. market growth) and 
exports played a relatively minor role. 
An intuitive explanation for this phenomenon is that the mineral 
booms, through increases in wages, salaries and profits, boosted 
aggregate demand for domestic manufactures. However, the real 
11 Before Botswana introduced its currency in 1976, it used 
South African Rand. 
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explanation goes beyond the automatic consumption linkage. This 
is partly because the mining sector is enclave in nature and as 
such demand arising from the returns to the factors employed in 
that sector would not be expected to have a great impact on 
industrial growth. In addition, increased demand alone, could not 
have led to growth in output and employment if the environment 
was not conducive to industrial development, as such demand could 
have been met by imports. Therefore, the government's 
macroeconomic response to the windfall, as well as its absorption 
policies regarding the transfer of the mineral income to the 
private(manufacturing) sector, played an important role(see 
section 3.3 and 3.4). 
While acknowledging the roles played by macroeconomic and other 
government policies, it is argued that the rapid growth during 
this period was largely a result of four factors: 
• The Financial Assistance Policy, which had been introduced in 
1982, offering substantial investment incentives to manufacturing 
firms was beginning to impact. A joint report by the World Bank 
and the government of Botswana(1993) showed that 16,872 
manufacturing jobs were directly linked to the scheme. Smith et 
al (1988), in their evaluation of the FAP, also commented that 
the scheme attracted some investments which could not have 
otherwise materialized. 
• The economy grew very rapidly (economic growth averaged 10.1% 
between 1980 and 1990) . Local firms benefitted from the increase 
in government demand through government procurement schemes(see 
sub-section 3.3.2). Although Kaplinsky (1993) argues that, .the 
scheme has not been successful because it operated in conj unction 
with a system of open tendering, it is hard to believe that local 
manufacturers did not benefit from the scheme, especially between 
1985 and 1990 when annual economic growth rate averaged 10.4%. 
This growth, led to a construction boom, especially in the 
government sector, which generated heavy demand for building 
materials and other manufactures. 
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• Due to Zimbabwe's economic problems, a number of firms from 
that country decided to relocate to Botswana and then export back 
to that country. As a result, exports to Zimbabwe rose from P12 
million in 1980 to P23 million in 1990(1995 prices). This was 
indeed spectacular growth and most of these exports were 
manufactures, especially textiles. 
• The Botswana Development Corporation (BDC), which had biased its 
investments towards urban property and commercial businesses, 
started to invest more in manufacturing. For instance, by 1980, 
32% of BDC funds were invested in manufacturing as compared to 
11% in 1975 (see sub-section 3. 2. 1) . It is argued that such 
developments led to some growth in the manufacturing sector. 
3.2.3 Phase III: The early 1990s 
In retrospect, the factors noted above which contributed to 
manufacturing growth in the 1980s were not sustainable. The 
cyclical downturn in the world economy which started in 1990 
impacted heavily on diamond exports and consequently on 
government revenues and expenditure. The result was an end to 
economic growth rates in excess of 10% per annum. The slow down 
in economic growth inevitably dampened demand for manufactures, 
especially building materials. 
However, even without a fall in government revenue, government 
demand for manufactures was bound to decline as most of the ,large 
infrastructural projects, such as construction of major roads, 
expansion of schools etc., which featured in NDP 6 and NDP 7 were 
completed by the early 1990s. Loss of incomes for those thrown 
out of work in other sectors of the economy also impacted on 
aggregate demand. This demonstrates that sustainable 
industrialization cannot be achieved through policies that 
encourage production for the domestic market. 
Exports to Zimbabwe were seriously affected by the implementation 
of a structural adjustment programme in that country, which 
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removed the artificial circumstances that had encouraged imports 
from Botswana. The Zimbabwe Dollar(Z$) was devalued, thus 
reducing the competitiveness of Botswana's exports to that 
country. For instance, the Pula/Z$ exchange rate rose from 1. 4071 
in December 1990 to 2.4347 the next December. As a result, 
exports to Zimbabwe fell from P256 million in 1991 to P166 
million in 1992(1995 prices). Exports to Zimbabwe continued to 
fall as the exchange rate appreciated. By 1994, exports to that 
country were just over P130 million. 
The FAP scheme was initially successful in creating jobs and 
increasing production, but not in a sustainable way. As table 3. 1 
shows, increase in output during the 1980-1990 decade lagged 
behind increase in employment. For instance, output grew at an 
annual average of 10.9 percent while the rate for employment was 
15.5. This suggests that productivity fell during this period. 
The fall in labour productivity was not accompanied by 
significant fall in real wages. Instead wages increased by an 
annual average of 1%. This implies a marginal increase in labour 
costs. This must have had an impact on the profitability of firms 
and their decisions to produce in the 1990s. 
The early 1990s coincided with the ending of FAP assistance to 
many firms. Some of the firms established with FAP assistance 
could not survive on their own and closed down. Of the over 
16,000 manufacturing jobs created by FAP between 1980 and 1990, 
a joint report by the World Bank and the government of 
Botswana ( 1993) estimates that only 11, 500 remained after the 
expiry of assistance. The magnitude of the fall- in FAP-related 
employment at the end of the assistance suggest that the scheme 
did not address the real problems affecting the sector. 
The result was that many of the firms which were established in 
the 1980s faced serious challenges by 1991. For the exporters, 
the Zimbabwean market had collapsed; for the majority which were 
selling domestically, economic growth had slowed, as the country 
was facing a recession. In all, output fell by. 2.3% and 
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employment by 17% between 1991 and 1994. This was in spite of 
increases in BDC investments in the sector and continued FAP 
grants(see sections 3.2.1 & 3.2.3). 
However, the latest statistics suggest that the manufacturing 
sector might be recovering. Manufacturing output rose by 4.3% 
between 1994 and 1995, while employment rose by 8%. "Non-
traditional 11 exports12 increased from around P290 million in 1992 
to over P700 million in 1994(Jefferis, 1996). The recovery has 
been particularly strong for the textile and garment sector which 
had been hard hit by the collapse of the Zimbabwe market. The 
sector, has now diversified into new markets(regional and 
international). Textile and garment exports, which had collapsed 
from P123 million in 1991 to P46 million in 1992, had recovered 
to P177 million by 1994(see table 3.2). There are also a number 
of new export products, of which motor vehicles are the most 
important. By March 1995, vehicles and parts accounted for nearly 
12% of total exports, making them the second largest exports 
after diamonds. However, there is very little value added in the 
automobile industry at the moment -- it is simply assembly of 
imported semi-knocked down(SKD) components. 
There has also been a remarkable change in the direction of 
exports. The re la ti ve importance of Zimbabwe as a destination for 
textiles has declined, giving way to the South African and the 
US markets. South Africa is also the most important market for 
motor vehicles assembled in Botswana. 
- --~~~~~- ~ - __ , - - - ---- - .. 
12 Non-traditional exports refers to all exports apart from 
diamonds, copper-nickel and beef, and represent mainly 
manufactured goods. 
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Table 3.2 Major Export Commodoties(P' 000, fob) 
Meat & Hides & Diamonds Copper Textiles Soda Vehicles Live Other Total 
Meat Skins Nickel Ash & Parts Anirna Goods Exports 
Products Matte ls 
.... i.9s·0·········2s-:i66···········3·:o:ff·············23·5-;?"j"J·············soj6"8"············i·S:64i·······················································i26············25354···········"39o:437·········· 
1985 97,548 11,686 1,048,116 119,870 28,934 317 77,813 1,384,284 
1986 120,091 10,176 1,202,414 121,052 43,177 319 122,037 1,619,265 
1988 112,167 11,672 1,979,163 371,190 60,261 500 143,304 2,678,258 
1990 105,455 19,952 2,613,618 271,120 111,742 420 196,784 3,319,091 
1991 123,410 17,831 2,941,456 296,351 122,978 21,959 587 213,438 3,738,009 
1992 129,753 19,878 2,898,922 265,832 76,490 43,362 1,091 239,663 3,674,991 
1993 160,556 20,356 3,340,224 219,829 94,983 50,366 682 334,039 4,312,071 
1994 172,749 28,294 3,716,694 258,787 177,351 36,779 300,806 2,302 260,726 4,954,488 
1995* 12,368 6,491 909,952 91,719 29,359 4,347 148,158 977 62,046 1,265,416 
Note:"-" stands for zero," .. " information not available. 
• Data for first Quarter only 
Source: Statistical Bulletin (1992 & 1995) 
3 .3. Sectoral Support for Manufacturing Sector 
In Botswana, as is the case in other countries with booming 
mining sectors, support for industry is important to counter the 
negative effects of the boom. 8 However, there are a variety of 
methods that can be used to promote industrialization. Gelb et 
al (1988), notes three options (which are non-distorting) , through 
which mineral income can be transferred to the private sector: 
reducing non-mineral taxes, granting subsidies to selected 
activities, or subsidizing certain products. 
The government of B')tswana, while pursuing a prudent 
macroeconomic policy, opted to transfer diamond income to the 
manufacturing sector by granting subsidies to selected 
activities. As figure 3.1 shows, the government transferred a 
substantial amount of mineral income to the manufacturing sector. 
13 Re-call that-PNG dict 'e'.;-erything right in the macr<;-economy' 
but industry remained weak due to lack of support. 
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Figure 3.1 Industry's Share of Development Spending. 
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Source: Central Statistics Office (Various issues). 
However, unlike Indonesia, Nigeria and Zambia, where governments 
were involved hands on in resource-based public industries, 
Botswana opted for an indirect approach. The government of 
Botswana has always maintained that it will leave the private 
sector to identify the engines of growth. Government policy in 
this regard is set out in the Industrial Development Policy ( IDP) , 
Government paper No. 2 of (1984: 2) 
The degree and type of direct government influence and 
participation is determined by Government's belief 
that a free enterprise, market-oriented system for 
this sector is both efficient in producing goods and 
services and economical in the use of scarce 
administrative capacity. 
Government will influence and assist industry with 
general incentives and services rather than detailed 
directives or controls ... Government will participate 
directly in this-s·ector- only by exception. 
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Hence, the government participated mainly through the Botswana 
Development Corporation (BDC) , government purchase schemes and the 
Financial Assistance Policy(FAP). 
3.3.1 Botswana Development Corporation(BDC) 
The BDC was established in 1970 to be the government's 
operational arm in promoting industry and commercial development, 
either in partnership with the private sector or, where private 
sector initiative was not forthcoming, on its own. The BDC is a 
link through which the government transfers mineral income to the 
manufacturing sector. 
As a supplier of venture capital, the BDC is expected to provide 
long-term funding to industrial projects which usually cannot get 
funds from commercial banks because of their long gestation 
periods. Although the BDC tended to invest mainly in urban 
property and commercial businesses, instead of the manufacturing 
sector in its early stages, that bias changed in the 1980s(see 
table 3.3 and figure 3.2). By the end of 1990, BDC had P52.9 
million invested in commerce and industry. In addition to loans 
and equity financing, the BDC also provided guarantees, factory 
premises, management advice and secretarial services. This helped 
establish industries, many of which the private sector was not 
willing to take up alone or could not get finance from commercial 
banks, to start up. In 1990, BDC had shares in 60 companies, 
which employed over 10, 000 people. Although the data does not 
show the breakdown of employment in different sectors, one can 
conclude on the basis of the share of manufacturing in total 
investment, that a significant number of the jobs were in 
manufacturing. 
Table 3.3 Sectoral Distribution of BDC Investments {%) 
Industry 1975 1980 1985 1990 
Commercial and Industrial property 48 32 21 36* 
Commerce and Industry 11 32 14 30 
Agriculture 10 6 15 4 
Hotels and Tourism 14 10 25 22 
Residential Property 14 16 10 
Financial Services 2 3 2 5 
Transport 1 11 4 
Small Scale enterprises 2 + 
Total 990 100 100 lOH 
Notes: * Includes residential property 
+ Support for SSEs was handled by Tswelelo, a subsidiary of BDC. 
o Difference due to error of rounding 
Source: BDC Annual Reports{1975-90) 
Figure 3.2 BDC Investment in Industry 
1975 1980 1985 1990 
Year 
Source: BDC Annual Reports{1975-90). 
3.3.2 Local Preference Scheme 
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This scheme was introduced in 1976 mainly to benefit domestic 
producers selling to the central government. It was later(1982) 
extended to include parastatal bodies and local government. The 
scheme basically provides for a maximum of 12. 5% price preferehce 
on any commodity which has a minimum of 25% local content. As 
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already argued in the previous section, this scheme helped 
promote industrial development. According to Kaplinsky (1993), its 
major success has been in the furniture and garment industry. 
3.3.3 Financial Assistance Policy(FAP) 
The Financial Assistance Policy is the main plank of government's 
industrial promotion. Simply put, FAP is a system of grants 
provided by the government to help entrepreneurs to start new 
businesses or expand existing ones. The scheme represents a 
direct transfer of mineral income to the private sector because, 
unlike the BDC, funds obtained through the scheme are outright 
grants which need not be repaid. The raison d'etre of FAP grants 
is derived from the fear that Botswana's small domestic market 
and the relatively unskilled labour force will make the initial 
costs of production higher than in competing countries. Thus, the 
grants are intended to cushion investors against these adverse 
effects during the early stages of operation. 
The Financial Assistance Policy, was introduced in 1982, and 
offers substantial investment incentives to manufacturing firms. 
From 1982 through fiscal year 1990/91 the program had disbursed 
P69.6 million and had committed P238.7 million, of which more 
than 80 percent were in the manufacturing sector. In recent years 
the government has paid out approximately P35 million a year by 
way of FAP grants. Studies show that the scheme indeed led to 
significant growth in the manufacturing sector in the 
eighties(See Smith et al, 1988). 
However, FAP has been criticized for disregarding productivity 
in its drive to create employment for unskilled workers (Jefferis, 
1996). The scheme provides assistance in the form of capital 
grant, training grant and tax holidays, but its main thrust is 
to subsidize wages of unskilled citizen labour. According to a 
joint report by World Bank and the government of Botswana(l993), 
nearly half of the grants disbursed in 1987 were on labour 
subsidies. As a result of this bias, firms tend to adopt more 
_, 
I 
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labour intensive production techniques than is necessary and 
later retrench when the assistance tapers off (Smith et al, 1988). 
Conclusion 
It is clear that the manufacturing sector experienced strong 
growth during the boom period(l980-1990) and then slowed down in 
the early 1990s. As was the case in other mineral economies, the 
source of growth came from domestic demand. However, the fact 
that exports played a very small role in manufacturing growth is 
perhaps more worrisome for Botswana than it was for large 
countries, such as Nigeria, because of the limit that the 
former' s domestic market size places on further development based 
on import substitution and increased domestic demand. 
The government transferred a significant amount of minerals 
revenue to support the manufacturing sector. For instance, BDC's 
total investments in manufacturing were approximately P250 
million in 1995, while FAP handed out about P35 million a year 
since 1991. However, despite government's generosity to the 
sector, there were problems of sustainability once the subsidies 
expired. This demonstrates that the problem did not arise from 
lack of government support per se. 
The next section investigates whether the problem could be found 
in the macroeconomic environment, for example, as a result of 
real exchange rate appreciation or an increase in real wages. 
3.4 Macroeconomic Policy Environment14 
Chapter two indicated that mineral booms can affect manufacturing 
development in two main ways: the resource movement effect and 
the spending effect. It was shown that if these effects were nOt 
addressed, then a boom in the mining sector may lead to de-
14 For a detailed analysis of macroeconomic management of 
mineral booms, see Harvey and Lewis, 1990; Hill, 1991; Hill and 
Mokgethi, 1989; Hill and Knight, 1996). 
industrialization(fall 
manufacturing sector) . 
in employment 
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and output in the 
There are basically two approaches by which these effects can be 
suppressed - prudent macroeconomic management and/or provision 
of subsidies to the affected sector. The previous section has 
shown that a significant amount of mineral income was used to 
subsidize the manufacturing sector. The experiences of Nigeria, 
Zambia, Indonesia and other countries show that prudent 
macroeconomic approach is also critical. This approach calls for 
governments, who in most cases are major recipients of the 
mineral windfalls, to spend the revenues prudently, so as not to 
cause an appreciation in the real exchange rate. Governments 
should also attempt to limit the demonstration effects of boom 
sector wages on other sectors. 
However, studies show that many governments in mineral economies 
have had difficulties keeping their expenditure and wage rates 
down(Gelb, 1988; Auty, 1993). In contrast, Botswana's 
macroeconomic policies during the mineral booms have been prudent 
and cautious. The major consequences of inappropriate 
macroeconomic management of a commodity boom real exchange 
rate appreciation and rapid increases in real wages -- did not 
occur in Botswana. These developments are dealt with in sections 
3.4.2 and 3.4.4. 
3.4.1 Government Spending Policy 
Diamond windfalls in Botswana can be described as public 
windfalls, in that most of the gains accrued to the government. 
The government gained from the boom by way of taxes, dividends 
from partial ownership in the mining company and from mineral 
royalties. Thus, the spending policy of the government had 
profound effects on the extent to which mineral booms eroded 
competitiveness of industry. As argued previously, in the case 
of Botswana, the spending effect was important as the resource 
movement effect was limited by the enclave nature of the mining 
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sector. 
As was the case in Nigeria, Zambia and other countries, 
government investment, as measured by development expenditure, 
rose in response to mineral revenues(figure 3.3). 
Figure 3.3: Government Revenues and Expenditure 
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Source: Statistical Bulletin (1981-1995). 
Despite the observed increase in government expenditure, there 
has not been any significant appreciation of the real exchange 
rate. Botswana maintained a stable real exchange rate throughout 
the boom period. The real effective exchange rate index 
oscillated between 115 and 97 during the period 1980 and 1993 (see 
figure 3. 4) . 15 This was because of both intervention in the 
currency market, and the manner in which the increase in 
expenditure took place. 
~ A decline(increase) in the index indicates real 
depreciation(appreciation) of the exchange rate. 
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According to Harvey(1992), this resulted in increases in 
construction costs and loss of quality of projects. However, the 
situation was quickly remedied by inviting construction companies 
from other countries, such as the Republic of China and South 
Korea. 
Figure 3.5 Development Expenditure, Planned vs Actual(constant 
1985/86 prices) 
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As a result, the prices of non-tradable goods started to increase 
faster than that of tradable goods in the early 1990s(see table 
3. 4) . 16 However, as shall be shown in the next section, the real 
exchange rate did not appreciate. This was due to the nominal 
exchange rate being devalued. The fact that the economy is 
extremely open also meant that the non-traded sector was small 
and as such did not have a significant impact on the real 
16 Pre-1990 data does not separate prices into tractable and 
non-tractable. 
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exchange rate. For instance, Botswana could easily buy services 
from South Africa. 
Table 3. 4 Cost-of-Living Indices: Tradable Goods and non-Tradable 
Goods (November 1991 = 100) 
Weight 1990 1991 1992 
s 
Non-tradable 24.69 86 97 110 
Tradable 75.31 86 96 113 
Note: 1995 data is for the first Quarter only. 
Source: Statistical Bulletin, 1995. 
3.4.2 Exchange Rate Policy 
1993 1994 1995 
131 151 161 
125 137 146 
In addition to prudent spending of mineral windfalls, the 
exchange rate policy was also used to prevent the real exchange 
rate from appreciating. However, between 1976 and 1982, the 
exchange rate policy was aimed at containing inflationary 
pressures especially from South Africa and as such had little 
regard for industry's competitiveness. By the mid-1980s, 
inflation was successfully arrested and the policy aim shifted 
towards ensuring competitiveness of industry. Thus, when the 
government lost control of its spending in the late eighties, the 
nominal exchange rate was devalued and this limited the 
appreciation of the real exchange rate(see table 3.5). 
Table 3.5: Chronology of Exchange Rate Events: 1976-1994 
Date 
1976 
1977 April 
1979 
1980 June 
1980 
1982 May 
1984 July 
1985 
January 
1989 June 
1990 Aug. 
1991 Aug. 
1994 June 
Action 
Introduction of the Pula. Pula pegged to US 
Dollar at Pl=US$1.15 
5% Pula revaluation 
5% Pula revaluation 
Pula taken off US Dollar peg. Introduction of 
Pula basket consisting of SDR17 and Rand 
5% Pula revaluation 
10% Pula devaluation 
5% Pula devaluation 
15% Pula devaluation 
5% Pula revaluation 
5% Pula devaluation 
5% Pula devaluation 
Technical adjustment 
Source: Bank of Botswana Report, 1994. 
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As a result, the Pula did not appreciate much against currencies 
of major trading partners(see figure 3.6). The sharp increase in 
the value of the Pula against the Zimbabwe Dollar, which started 
in 1991, was a result of structural adjustments programme in 
Zimbabwe, which led to the devaluing of Dollar. Therefore, it 
does not suggests that mineral booms led to appreciation of the 
Pula. 
17 Special Drawing Right is a unit of account of the 
International Monetary Fund. It is comprised of the US Dollar, 
Duetsche Mark, Japanese Yen, UK Pound and French Franc. 
Figure 3.6 Pula Exchange Rate against Selected Currencies 
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In addition to cautious budgetary and sound exchange rate 
policies, the government also avoided the excessive real wage 
increases observed in Nigeria and Zambia. This was done through 
wages and incomes policy. The main objectives of the policy were 
to limit competitive bidding for scarce skilled citizen manpower 
by restricting private and parastatal sectors to wage and salary 
levels set by the government and to tie unskilled labour wages 
to productivity in agriculture. This helped suppress the extent 
of the increase in real manufacturing wages(see figure 3.7). As 
a result, Botswana's wage rates are regionally competitive, in 
spite of its booming mining sector(table 3.6). 
• 
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Figure 3.7: Indices of Real Wages and Productivity in Industry. 
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Table 3.6: Manufacturing Wage Comparison for Selected Countries 
Country 
India(l989) 
China 
Kenya(l991) 
Zimbabwe 
Swaziland(l992) 
Thailand 
Botswana 
South Africa(l993) 
Earnings/month in $ {1994, unless 
otherwise stated} 
25.40 
42.25 
118.40 
173.60 
199.00 
199.30 
202.80 
720.00 
Source: Yearbook of Labour Statistics(ILO 1995) 
Exchange rates: International Financial Statistics 
Yearbook(IMF 1995) 
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Conclusion 
Unlike Nigeria, Zambia and other mineral economies, where mineral 
booms have hindered industrialization as a result of exchange 
rate appreciation and rapidly increasing wage rates, Botswana 
did almost everything right to cushion industry from the 
corrosive effects of the boom. Exchange rate appreciation. and 
excessive real wage increases appear to have been successfully 
avoided. The government also transferred substantial mineral 
revenues to the manufacturing sector. In spite of all these 
efforts, industrial growth has remained limited and the 
contribution of the sector to national output has actually 
declined. 
On the basis of the above analysis, it would be difficult to 
support a vio that the cause of the country's industrial 
backwardness is a consequence of booms in the minerals sector. 
It is concluded therefore that mineral booms cannot be held 
responsible for the mediocre performance of the manufacturing 
sector in Botswana. 
In the next Chapter the results of a case study which was aimed 
at assessing the factors responsible for Botswana's industrial 
development, will be presented. The results support the 
conclusion that booms in the mining sector did not hinder 
industrial development. 
/ 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Factors impacting on the growth of the manufacturing sector: Case 
Studies/Survey Results 
4 .1 Introduction 
It was concluded in chapter three that limited industrial 
development in Botswana cannot be attributed to the corrosive 
effects of mineral booms. This chapter provides supporting 
evidence from a case study-cum-survey. The survey was aimed at 
identifying the major factors which have impacted on past and 
present industrial performance. Managers were interviewed on the 
basis of a questionnaire which sought information on ownership 
structure, markets, productivity, finance, government assistance 
and the attractions and obstacles of operating in Botswana. The 
study's main findings are that high wages or the strength of the 
currency were not major impediments to the operations of the 
firms interviewed. 18 
Due to time and resource constraints, the study was restricted 
to firms operating in and around Gaborone. The composition of the 
sample is presented in table 4.1. Although the number of firms 
was small (eighteen) and restricted to one geographical area, they 
were well spread in terms of ownership, size, products and 
markets. Whereas a larger and more geographically dispersed 
survey would have been more representative, the small sample size 
allowed for the collection of relatively detailed, case-study 
type information. 
18 The detailed survey findings ~re set out in Appendix 2. 
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Table 4.1 Some Characteristics of Firms Interviewed 
Company Location Products Export share(%) 
1 Tlokweng Garments Less than 5 
2 Gaborone Garments over 95 
3 Ramotswa Dry foodstuffs 90 
4 Gaborone Garments 20 
5 Gaborone Paints 0 
6 Gaborone Pharmaceuticals 0 
7 Gaborone Soap and Edible oil Less than 10 
8 Gaborone Concrete products 0 
9 Mogoditshane Garments 25 
10 Gaborone Cement 0 
11 Ramotswa Garments 100 
12 Gaborone Pharmaceuticals 0 
13 Gaborone Garments 20 
14 Gaborone Paper products 20 
15 Tlokweng Meat products 0 
16 Ramotswa Matches 70 
17 Gaborone Fencing Products 0 
18 Gaborone Garments Over 99 
4.2 Presentation of Results 
4.2.1 Major obstacles 
Firms were asked to rank the six most important obstacles to 
their operation. A summary of the rankings is presented in figure 
4.1. Low productivity was ranked as the most important obstacle. 
However, this needs to be qualified with the information obtained 
during interviews and from other sections of the questionnaire. 
The respondents commented that there was a shortage of skilled 
labour (lack of skilled labour is ranked third) in the country and 
this made productivity low at the start of operation and-whenever 
new workers were recruited, but it improved with time. High 
utility, input and transport costs were also reported as major 
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obstacles. The other major obstacle was marketing difficulties. 
The exchange rate was regarded as only slightly important, while 
high wage rates were not a constraint at all. 
This suggests that the effect of the boom on industry through 
high wages and overvalued currency has been limited. Therefore 
mineral windfalls cannot be blamed for the weakness of the 
manufacturing sector. 
Figure 4.1 Major Obstacles of Operating in Botswana 
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Note: Scores are recorded in Appendix 2. 
Source: Interviews 
4.2.2 Productivity and wages 
50 60 70 
One of the ways by which mineral booms retard industrial 
development is through rapid increases in real wages. Real wage 
increases, if not accompanied by improvements in labour 
productivity, will raise labour costs and thus undermine the 
ability of industry to compete with imports. 
-· ·-·--- - ·-
It is interesting to report that, from the firms interviewed, 
wage rates were not seen as a hinderance to the viability of the 
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operation. Only three firms reported that high wages were a 
problem, but ranked it among the least important obstacles(see 
Appendix 2). Otherwise, wages were reported to be competitive by 
regional standards. One manager commented that, 
"our competitiveness in the region lies with wage 
rates. While productivity is slightly lower by 
regional standards, wage rates are so low that the end 
result is relatively low labour costs." 
Another respondent, a financial controller of a company which 
payed its workers at a rate 7% above the instituted minimum rate, 
argued that, "the minimum wage rate[Pl.35 per hour] is too low 
to motivate people to work." Thus, there is evidence to suggest 
that the booms in the minerals sector did not undermine 
industry's competitiveness through a rapid increase in wages. 
These results are in line with the conclusion reached in the 
previous chapter, where it was shown that there has not been any 
significant increase in real manufacturing wages. 
As already mentioned, 
factors that make a 
wage rates are just one element of the 
firm competitive. The other part is 
productivity. There are many ways by which firms measure 
productivity. From the interviews, the most common were 
actual production as a ratio of potential machine capacity; and 
output per worker per shift. 
Nine firms reported that low productivity was the most important 
obstacle which they faced(see section 4.2.1). However, they 
commented that it was sufficient to enable them to compete in the 
SACU market, especially when the current wage rates were taken 
into consideration. All, but two firms commented that although 
productivity was very low at the start of the operation and when 
new workers were recruited, it improved with time. The two firms 
who reported that their labour productivity did not improve with 
time, explained that it was due to "high labour turn-over." 
Therefore, for these two, their problems can be pinned down to 
poor management and is thus not a reflection of a pr6ductivity 
trend in the industry. 
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Those who reported improvements in productivity explained that 
low productivity was a result of many factors, the most common 
of which were low levels of technical skills. One manager 
lamented that, "there are no institutions where people can learn 
trades such as sewing, or design." Another manager said; 
"The absence of technical schools force us to send our 
workers to as far as Durban. This is very expensive 
because in addition to tuition fees, we have to pay 
for their accommodation as well." 
This concern was expressed by many other managers, who said that 
the lack of technical skills was because there were no schools 
that offer them. Although there were 31 vocational and technical 
schools, which enrolled over 5000 students. these institutions 
offered mainly elementary bricklaying, carpentry, auto-mechanics 
and few other trades, and none of them offered clothing industry-
related training such as fashion design. 
The other contributory factor was identified as attitude towards 
work. Three managers reported that some workers seemed 
disinterested in the extra monies obtained from working overtime 
or on weekends. One manager commented that, 
"people will tell you that they cannot work after 
hours because they have to prepare food for their 
husbands or children." 
On the attitudes towards work, other managers (two) commented that 
productivity enhancement was not a "mechanical exercise." 
"You don't just increase bonuses and expect people to 
improve their productivity. You need to show people 
that you care for them. You must listen to their 
complaints and try to understand their problems", One 
manager said. 
The other said that managers should make workers feel that they 
are part of the company. 
Two firms associated ·1ow productivity with low--viages. ·one 
financial controller put it thus, 
"If you pay your worker Pl. 35 an hour, what do you 
expect to get in return? You must know that this 
worker needs energy to work, and if you don't pay him 
enough to cover his energy needs, where do you expect 
him to get it from?" 
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All respondents identified training, bonus schemes and good 
management as the main motivations for productivity improvement. 
Therefore, productivity was regarded as a management problem 
which could be easily improved with the right policies. 
Although the causes of low productivity are varied, there is an 
urgent need to address the issue, if firms are to compete in 
international markets. Society needs to be educated on the 
importance of productivity, so that they can change their 
attitudes towards work. There is also a need to improve technical 
skill levels in the country. 
4.2.3 Material Inputs 
In a competitive market the source of raw materials plays an 
important role in the competitiveness of an industry. A firm that 
obtains its materials from a cheaper source, ceteris paribus, 
will always have lower production costs, and will therefore be 
more competitive. However, in reality there are a number of 
factors that determine where firms can obtain their raw 
materials. The most common of these are location; trade regimes; 
and availability of information and finance. 
In a country with a poor information base, it will be difficult 
for firms to locate the cheapest sources of raw materials. High 
tariffs on imports can shift demand from the cheapest sources to 
expensive local sources. Another problem arises when the cheapest 
source does not supply materials on credit and thus force firms 
to look elsewhere. 
Table 4. 2 shows the major sources of material - ifipurs -fo:r-- the 
firms interviewed. Fifteen firms got 50% or more of their raw 
materials from South Africa. In this group of firms, there were 
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those who obtained materials from this source because they did 
not know of other cheaper sources or were linked to big groups 
in South Africa, who did the sourcing for materials. The other 
group were those who were discouraged from sourcing elsewhere by 
high tariff walls on imports from outside the SACU area. The 
former comprised mainly small citizen owned enterprises (four) and 
those subsidiaries(three) of large groups who opened factories 
in Botswana to be close to their local customers or to take 
advantage of a cheap local input. One manager of a cement company 
reported that, 
"We are part of a large South African group who owns 
rights for large limestone deposits, which is a major 
input in our product. We decided to open a plant in 
Botswana to take advantage of the availability of fly-
ash, which is the other input in our product." 
An administrative officer of a small clothing manufacturer 
commented that "We always hear that there are cheaper sources of 
materials in Asia, but how do we contact them?" Those firms who 
reported that they were discouraged by high tariffs were mainly 
medium to large scale companies. 
Table 4.2 Main Source of Material Inputs(SO% plus) 
Market 
Domestic 
South Africa 
Southern African Region 
International 
Number of firms 
3 
15 
6 
3 
Note: Firms obtained material inputs from more than one source. 
Source: Interviews 
As table 4.2 shows, only three firms reported that they obtained 
50% or more of their material inputs from domestic suppliers. For 
one of these three, the source was a recently established cement 
company which obtained more than 60% of its materials from South 
Africa. One of the managers of the other two reported that, 
"Our problem is with money. There are no foreign 
suppliers who can give us materials on credit. So we 
are forced to buy from local suppliers, who themselves 
obtain these materials from South Africa." 
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This suggests that industry has limited linkages, especially 
backward linkages, with the rest of the economy. As a result, 
mining booms have had a limited impact on manufacturing input 
prices. The fact that the economy is extremely open also tends 
to reduce the non-traded sector, and thus further limits the 
extent to which mineral windfalls can affect manufacturing 
sector. 
All the firms who obtained materials from South Africa and 
domestic producers complained about high prices. Two managers 
said that in addition to high prices, some of the materials were 
not of international quality standard. Most of the firms(eight) 
who obtained material inputs from the above-mentioned sources, 
served the domestic market only. Others supplied a small 
percentage(about 20%) of their output to South Africa and other 
regional markets. This was partly a result of the cost of 
materia.ls which were too high for firms to be competitive in the 
export market. 
Six firms obtained 50% or more of their materials from regional 
and international markets. These sources were reported to be 
cheaper. As a result, this group of firms were successful 
exporters, although their main markets were South Africa, and the 
Southern African region. Therefore, the source of material inputs 
also play a very important role in firms' ability to serve the 
export market. 
4.2.4 Competition 
South African firms were the main competitors for the firms 
interviewed. This was to be expected given that the two countries 
are in a Customs Union, where international competitors are 
isolated by high tariff walls. However, the support that South 
African firms enjoy in Botswana is interesting. Six of the 
fifteen firms serving the domestic market commented that local 
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wholesalers, chain stores and the government preferred South 
African products over their products even when the latter were 
cheaper. One managing director said, 
"There is a perception among Batswana, even in the 
government purchasing departments that local companies 
cannot produce any product of quality." 
This sentiment was expressed by other managers as well. One 
financial controller put it thus; 
"If I ask you what soap you use at your house, you 
will say Lux, Breeze, Choice. . . and not Marang or 
Kgalagadi or ... won't you?" 
The former are imports while the latter are local products. This 
attitude can only be changed through the production of high 
quality products and intensive marketing. 
Another observation from the study is that most local 
distributors were owned by South African groups. Three firms 
serving the domestic market commented that in order to sell to 
local wholesalers, they had to first obtain certificates of 
approval from the wholesalers' purchasing departments in South 
Africa. Another firm complained that, 
a merger between [a major local 
and [a South African wholesaler] early 
[the wholesaler] has cut its demand for my 
"ever since 
wholesaler] 
last year, 
products." 
Thus, competition from South Africa makes it difficult for 
certain industries in Botswana to develop. 
4.2.5 Ownership and Markets 
Botswana firms face four different markets for their products -
domestic; South Africa; Southern Africa(excluding South Africa) 
and international. These markets have different characteristics 
regarding size, protection levels, price levels and distance. 
These characteristics influence the extent to which they can be 
served by local firms and the agents needed to penetrate them. 
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As table 4.3 shows, the most important markets for the firms 
interviewed were the local and the South African. 
Table 4.3 Main Markets for Products 
Market 
Domestic 
South Africa 
Southern African Region 
International 
n=l8 
Source: Interviews 
Number of firms 
11 
5 
1 
1 
Of citizen owned enterprises, the orientation to the domestic 
market is even more marked(see appendix 2). Only one of the four 
wholly citizen-owned firms had just started exporting and it 
exported only 20 per cent of its total production. This is not 
at all surprising. Exports require market intelligence (which all 
four citizen-owned firms lacked) . They also require international 
connections(only one firm had recently established them). As the 
manager of the only exporter in this group of firms put it: 
"The export market is very strict on quality and 
purchasing departments do not just order from any 
manufacturer. They need to be sure that they will get 
the right quality at the requested time. So for them 
to buy from you, you have to be recommended by someone 
they have been dealing with." 
This firm entered the export market through doing subcontracting 
work for a large South African manufacturer. They first came into 
contact with this manufacturer through some of their workers who 
were sent for training at an institution which had links with the 
manufacturer. 
The other problem is that exporting enterprises are relatively 
large and require relatively large initial investments, which 
citizens do not have. All, but one, citizen-owned firm had fixed 
assets of less than P2 million. This is because unlike their 
foreign-owned counterparts, who can get external loans from their 
countries of origin, citizen-owned firms have difficulties 
accessing finance(see section 4.2.7). 
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The study also revealed existence of a positive correlation 
between foreign ownership and exports. This has to do with 
international connections, marketing expertise and capital. One 
citizen manager of a joint venture company commented that, 
"Initially this company was 100% locally owned, but 
when I needed to expand into exports I had to look for 
partners. To export needed a lot of capital and since 
I couldn't get it locally, I had to look for 
international partners." 
At the time of the interview the company was 75% owned by a 
British group. 
Only two out of six wholly foreign owned enterprises did not 
produce for export. Three of the exporters sold over 90% of their 
production in the export market(foodstuffs and garments). In the 
joint venture category, only three firms out of seven were not 
engaged in export. This was either because the ratio of transport 
costs to value was too high for exporting to be profitable (cement 
and concrete products) 
product required long 
conditions to be 
place(pharmaceuticals) 
or the laws governing the sale of the 
procedures to be followed and certain 
met before export could take 
It is clear therefore that the expansion of exports may depend 
on the ability of local firms to attract foreign partners or the 
government to lure foreign investors. 
4.2.6 Exporters 
As table 4.1 shows, only five of the eighteen firms interviewed 
can be referred to as exporters. For these firms, the main market 
was South Africa, especially the Gauteng area, which is four 
hundred kilometres from Gaborone. The demand from this market, 
especially for textiles and garments was reported to be very 
high. One manager put it thus, 
"The demand is so high that we are forced to operate 
24 hours a day and seven days a week and yet we can't 
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meet all the orders." 
Another manager commented that plans were "at an advanced stage 
to open another factory as we cannot meet all our orders from 
this one." All the exporters reported that their competitive edge 
was in price, quality and consistent timely deliveries. "Our 
labour is not restive and as a result we always deliver on time", 
One manager said. When asked to comment on quality, he said, "Our 
denim cloth is at the top of the quality range because of 
this [spinning, dying and pressing machine] . " These firms combined 
labour intensity with modern state-of-the-art technology. 
4. 2 • 7 'Finance 
Finance was not seen as a major obstacle to the firms' operation. 
However, there were six companies who reported that finance was 
a problem. Of these six, three reported that interest rates were 
high and that commercial banks did not provide advanced products. 
The other three complained that the banks refused to give them 
loans or support to get credit from suppliers, even when they 
provided the surety of large government orders. One manager, 
lamented that, 
"Banking systems here are not user friendly . . . for 
example, this year I had a government order worth P3 
million, but they couldn't give us a facility to open 
a letter of credit to the suppliers of raw material 
inputs. We provided this order as surety and you know 
that a government order is as good as money. But they 
refused." 
In line with expectation, these three were (wholly or partly) 
owned by citizens. This could explain why there is so little 
citizen ownership in the medium and large scale category of 
industry(about 31%). This shows that for the relatively small 
firms, working capital is still a serious constraint to their 
operation. 
4.2.8 Marketing 
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The success of any enterprise depends on its sales, which in turn 
depend on its ability to market its products. A firm can produce 
cheap, high quality products, but if not properly marketed, its 
sales will remain low as few buyers would know about the 
products. Thus, in a competitive market, marketing plays a very 
important role in the success of any company. 
In the survey, information was sought on marketing strategies 
employed and the extent to which marketing was a problem to the 
firm's operation. The most commonly used marketing strategy was 
foreign expertise based in the country(thirteen firms). 
Independent agents working on commission were also used 
widely(seven firms). But the most interesting observation was 
that, the four major exporters had a unique combination of two 
of the following: foreign expertise based in the country, foreign 
expertise based abroad and independent marketing agents working 
on commission. These strategies have the advantages of ensuring 
that at least one of the agents was in close contact with the 
market. However, the costs involved in these combinations put 
them out of reach of many firms. 
The extent to which marketing was a problem differed amongst 
firms. In all, twelve firms reported that it was a problem. The 
problems with marketing ranged from costs to availability of 
expertise. As one financial controller put it, 
"[Name of firm] about two years ago was launching a 
marketing competition. We could not get advertising, 
marketing jingles locally ... So we had to go to South 
Africa. As you know we still depend on South African 
television even to reach our local market. To go to 
South Africa to make an advert means more costs for 
local producers." 
Another respondent commented that, 
"The cheapest sales representative will tell you that 
I am prepared to work if you pay me a basic salary of 
PlOOO and a 10% commission over and above the flat 
rate. Some of us cannot afford this amount." 
Marketing is certainly a serious prob],em for many firms in 
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the region as whole is becoming more stable. However, all these 
advantages need to be retained or even improved upon. 
Figure 4.2 Principal Motives for Operating in Botswana 
Access to RSA market 
Low taxes 
Stable labour relations 
Economic climate 
FAP /LPS 
0 10 20 30 40 
Score rating 
Note: See Appendix 2 for how the scores were rated. 
Source: Interviews 
4.3 Summary and Conclusions 
50 60 
The survey has shown that, although uncompetitive by 
international standards, Botswana's manufacturing sector was 
competitive by southern African standards. It has also shown that 
the problems that afflict the sector were not primarily a result 
of the boom in the mining sector. 
+ Wage rates were not a hinderance to most firms, instead it 
was productivity which was a problem. Productivity was low 
by international standards owing primarily to low labour 
skills in the country. Wage rates were reported to be low, 
thus supporting the conclusion reached in the previous 
chapter, that a rapid increase in real wages did not occur. 
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• Exchange rate (appreciation) was not a major obstacle to 
firms. The strength of the domestic currency was not a 
problem to the competitiveness of the firms interviewed. 
Instead, it was the weakening of the currency which was a 
concern for some firms, as this tended to increase the Pula 
cost of materials obtained from outside SACU areas. 
• Industry. in Botswana has few backward linkages with the 
rest of the economy. This further limits the extent to 
which mineral booms impact on the sector's input prices. 
Similarly, Botswana's membership in SACU and its reliance 
on South Africa for material inputs also limit the impact 
of mineral booms on in1ustry. 
• In addition to being a source of material inputs, South 
African industry also owned major distributors in Botswana. 
This suggests that events in South Africa had a profound 
influence on manufacturing development. For instance, the 
recent growth in the South African economy was shown to 
have positive effects on industry through increased demand 
for Botswana's products. 
+ There was a negative relationship between local ownership 
and exports. This was primarily due to the lack of finance, 
international connections and marketing expertise among 
citizens. 
It is clear, therefore, that low wages and a stable real exchange 
rate are necessary, but not sufficient conditions for industrial 
development. There are other impediments, that need to be 
addressed, such as lack of finance and marketing skills among 
citizen entrepreneurs; low labour productivity, lack of skilled 
workers, high utility, input and transport costs and competition 
from South Africa. There is a need for policy to deal with these 
impediments. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Conclusions: An overview 
This study's aim was to investigate those structural features of 
the economy which are responsible for the past industrial 
, development record, and assess the limitations they impose on the 
sector's future development. Although the study's main focus was 
on those features which are related to booms in the mining 
sector, it also assessed other factors that impact on industrial 
development. 
The main argument of this enquiry is that industrial backwardness 
or the problems that afflict industrial development in Botswana 
do not arise from the presence of booms in the minerals sector. 
Macroeconomic data show that the major effects through which the 
Dutch disease manifests itself -- real exchange rate appreciation 
and rapid increase in real wages - - have been successfully 
contained. This conclusion is supported by microeconomic data, 
which show that neither high wages nor strength of the currency 
was reported as a major obstacle to the operation of the firms 
interviewed. 
The thesis also shows that the government has transferred 
substantial amounts of mineral income to industry. However, some 
industries and employment created through government subsidies 
were not sustainable. While the problems of industrial 
development in other mineral economies, such as Zambia and 
Nigeria, arose from poor management of the booms, Botswana did 
almost everything right to lessen the corrosive effects of 
mineral windfalls on industrial development. Insofar as the 
industrial sector has not performed as well as it might have, the 
causes have more to do with the supply side capabilities of firms 
and limited direct foreign investment. Lack of marketing skills 
early nineties, following Zimbabwe's structural adjustments which 
led to devaluation of the Dollar, the Pula did not appreciate 
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against currencies of major trading partners. It is recommended 
that the current exchange rate regime be continued. Steps should 
be taken to ensure that the Pula does not appreciate excessively 
against the Rand as South Africa is the main market for exports 
and offers considerable potential for expansion. 
5.2.3 Productivity 
The study has revealed that productivity has been falling 
throughout the 1980s, but slowly picked up since the turn of the 
decade. The fall in productivity was due, mainly, to the 
Financial Assistance Policy of the government, which tended to 
bias techniques of production towards labour, with little 
consideration for productivity(Jefferis, 1996). However, even 
without the influence of the scheme, productivity in Botswana is 
still low by international standards, owing primarily to low 
skill levels. The recent reforms of the FAP, which attach more 
importance to training, are a step in the right direction. 
However, there is also a need to introduce industry related 
subjects in school syllabi at all levels and to have more 
institutions that offer technical or industry-related skills. It 
is therefore recommended that the government should consider 
building such schools. 
5.2.4 Exports 
Although recent trends show an expansion of non-traditional 
exports, manufacturing development is mainly oriented towards the 
domestic market. The recent development is therefore very 
encouraging. Successful exporters were mainly large scale 
enterprises which combined labour intensity with modern state-of-
the-art technology. These enterprises were primarily owned by 
foreign groups. Since small citizen-owned enterprises had 
difficulties exporting, it is concluded that, large scale 
operation, combination of labour-intensity and modern technology, 
and foreign ownership are the necessary requirements for 
penetration of the export markets. 
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However, with the current level of productivity and wage rates, 
it will be difficult for local industries to compete in 
international markets. Therefore, firms should target the 
regional markets, especially South Africa, where competition is 
less severe - some local firms are already doing well there. 
This market has many decisive advantages over other markets(at 
least in the short· run) it is protected from foreign 
competition, the economy is on the expansion path and wages are 
relatively higher. This makes the SACU arrangement more important 
than ever before. It is recommended that any SACU negotiations 
should ensure its continuity. 
It will be an understatement to suggest that it will be easy for 
firms to penetrate the South African market. The market is 
dominated by large conglomerates which have integrated all the 
way down to distribution. To penetrate such a market would 
require resources that individual firms might not possess. It is 
recommended that the government, through the BDC, consider 
assisting firms in this regard, even if it means buying or 
getting into partnerships with some already established 
distributors in that country. 
An opportunity also exists for certain South African firms to be 
encouraged to relocate to Botswana to serve the regional market 
and fill the under-utilized quota of Botswana products to 
industrialized countries under the Lome Convention. 
5.2.5 Major Obstacles 
Lack of material inputs at reasonable prices is one of the major 
obstacles to the operation of industries in Botswana. Most 
material inputs are obtained from South Africa, despite it not 
being the cheapest source. Firms obtain materials from this 
source because of the unavailability of a data base on the 
cheapest sources which tend to raise search costs. Tariffs on 
materials obtained from outside the SACU also, make it difficult 
for firms to get materials from cheaper sources. It is 
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recommended that the government should look at ways by which such 
a base can be made available to firms. The government should also 
negotiate for lifting of tariffs on imports of inputs for certain 
industries, even when the final products are destined for the 
SACU market. 
Marketing, because of the costs and skills involved, is one of 
the main constraints on export expansion. Judging by the size of 
the firms, and the responses of those interviewed, it will be 
difficult for individual firms to effectively market their 
products outside Botswana. Marketing requires resources and 
expertise that most industries do not have. It is recommended 
that the government, through the BDC, help firms in this regard. 
BDC can target specific markets and buy shares in distributors 
in those countries. 
5. 3 Concluding Remarks 
"The performance of critical sectors such as 
manufacturing, ... , which are key to achieving the 
goal of economic diversification, remained 
disappointing at best" (Ministry of Finance, 1996: 5). 
It has been argued in the study that the problem did not arise 
from the corrosive effects o::: booms in the mining sector. 
Botswana appears to have done everything right to lessen the 
impact of mineral windfalls on the manufacturing sector. 
The study has identified some of the constraints that are 
responsible for the past record and impose limitations on the 
sector's future development. It is hoped that these constraints 
will form a basis for a detailed investigation by those entrusted 
with the responsibility of reformulating the country's industrial 
development policy~ 
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APPENDIX 1 
A: GENERAL INFORMATION 
1. Name of firm: ................................................................................................................................. . 
2. Year of start-up: ............................................................................................................................... . 
3. Value of fixed assets: ....................................................................................................................... . 
4. Is the company; 
(i) A new business D 
(ii) Relocation D 
(iii) Take-over II 
4. What percentage o~mpany is; (i) Foreign owned? ........................................................... % 
(ii) Locally owned? .......................................................... % 
Specify country in (i) above: ............................................................................................................... . 
5. Number of employees: ........................................................... . 
(i) Managerial and professional level: ................................. . 
(ii) Skilled: ................................................................................. . 
(iii) Semi-skilled: ....................................................................... . 
(iv) Unskilled:.: ......................................................................... . 
6. Company's main products: ............................................................................................................... . 
7. How important have the following been on your decision to set-up business in Botswana? (Please 
rank h · · ) t e six most important 
Descriotion Rank 
FAP/LPS 
Local raw materials 
Political stability 
Liberal exchange controls 
Regional location 
Access to RSA market 
Low taxes 
Low labour costs 
Stable labour relations 
Economic climate 
Other (specify) 
8. Please rank the six(6) most important obstacles to your operation. 
Export Domestic 
market market 
High wages 
Low productivity 
High utility costs 
High input costs 
Lack of skilled workers 
Lack of access to finance 
Lack of industrial land 
High transport costs 
Exchange rate 
Marketing costs 
Other (specify) 
• 
I 
• 
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B. MARKETS, MARKETING AND COMPETITION 
1. What percentage of your total sales was in the export market in: (i) 1993 ...................................... % 
(ii) 1994 .................................... % 
(iii) 1995 ................................... % 
(iv) 1996 ..................................... % 
2. Please rank your most important markets; 
(i) ............................................................................................................. . 
(ii) ............................................................................................................. . 
(iii) ......................................................................... ································· .. . 
(iv) ............................................................................................................ . 
3. Do you plan to increase your production in the next three years? YESc:l 
If yes, which market are you targeting? 
NOc:l 
(i) Export .................. % (ii) Domestic ............ % 
4. Through which of the following channels have you sold your products in; 
a. Export markets 
(i) Parent company abroad 
(ii)Direct marketing by firm, using 
a. Foreign expertise based in Botswana 
b. Foreign expertise based abroad 
c. Motswana based in Botswana 
d. Motswana based abroad 
(iii) Independent marketing agent working on commission 
(iv) Own retail outlet abroad 
(v) Other (please specify) .................................................................................................................... . 
b. Domestic market? 
(i) Factory outlet YESc:J NoC:J 
(ii) Own retail markets downstream YESc:i Nct::::::J 
(iii) Other (please specify) ................................................................................................................... . 
5. What percentage of your inputs come from? 
(i) Domestic producers ................................................................................................................. o/o 
(ii) Imported ................................................................................................................................. % 
6. Please rank your four major competitors( country only) 
(i) ................................................................................................ . 
(ii) ............................................................................................... . 
(iii) ................................... ·············· ............................................. . 
7. What advantages do they have over you? .......................................................................................... . 
8. What advatanges do you have over them? ........................................................................................ . 
C.FINANCE 
1. What were the sources your start-up finance? 
(i) Own finance .............................................. % 
(ii) Bank loan ................................................. % 
(iii) Government grant... ................................ % 
(iv) Other (specify) ......................................... % 
2. Describe any difficulties in the operation of the financial system or banks that have hindered the 
operation of your business ................................................................................................................... . 
78 
····························································································································································· 
····························································································································································· 
D. PRODUCTIVITY 
1. How do you measure productivity? ................................................................................................... . 
····························································································································································· 
····························································································································································· 
2. Please rank productivity of the following categories of employees. 
· Verv low Low Moderate High 
Managerial 
Skilled 
Semi-skilled 
Unskilled 
3. Which of the following measures have you used to address the situation in (2) above? 
(i) Training YESc:::J NO c:::J 
(ii) Bonus schemes YESc:::J NOc:::J 
(iii) Other (please specify) ............................................................................................................... . 
4. Please comment on the productivity trend in the past three years ...................................................... . 
E. GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE 
1. Do you receive any of the following government assistance? 
(i) FAP YEsc:::J Noc:::J 
(ii) Local preference scheme(LPS) YESc:::J NOc:::J 
(iii) Other (please specify) ................................................................................................................ . 
2. How important is the assistance to your operation? 
Not important Slightly important Important Very important 
FAP 
LPS 
Other( specify) 
THANK YOU 
I _, 
APPENDIX 2: SURVEY RESULTS 
FIRM 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 TOTAL 
YEAR ESTABLISHED 86 92 85 92 75 91 85 81 90 96 90 92 90 85 82 87 89 91 
TOTAL INVESTMENT A c c A B B c c B c c A c A c B c c 
Employment: Total 29 241 780 43 65 45 96 172 75 34 350 20 70 82 123 60 48 360 2,693 
Semi-skilled 165 50 30 l!S 28 20 20 7 270 65 10 12 200 892 
Unskilled 19 24 675 9 35 31 45 124 20 16 25 17 65 7 88 45 27 36 1,308 
Origins: New business • • • • • @ • • • • • • • • • • 15,5 Relocation @ 
Take over • • 2,5 
Ownership: Local • 0 • • @ @ @ @ @ • @ 7,25 Regional 0 • • • @ @ @ @ @ 5,25 International @ @ @ • • • @ 5,5 
Markets: Domestic @ 0 @ • • @ • @ • • @ @ • @ • 10,75 South Africa @ @ 0 @ • @ 0 @ • 5,25 Regional @ @ 0 0 0 1,25 
Global 0 ,25 
Marketing strategy:FBB @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ • 7 FBA @ @ 1 
MBA 0 ,25 
' IADC @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 3,5 
Other @ @ @ @ @ @ • @ @ @ @ 6 
l 
Competition: South Africa i @ @ @ @ @ @ @ • @ @ @ @ @ @ • @ @ @ 10 I Regional @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 4 l 
Global @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 3,5 l ! 
~ 
Productivity: Low @ @ 0 @ @ @ @ @ • 4,75 I Acceptable • • @ @ @ @ • @ 0 @ • @ @ @ @ @ @ 10,25 i High @ @ @ @ @ 2,5 I 
Source of materials: '. 
Domestic @ 0 0 @ @ 0 @ 0 2.5 I 
South Africa @ @ @ @ @ 0 0 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 8 
Regional @ @ @ @ @ @ 2 
International 0 @ 0 0 @ @ 3,5 
Source of funds: 
Own 0 @ @ @ 0 @ @ @ @ • @ @ @ @ • @ @ 9 Bank Loan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 5,5 
Government grant 0 0 0 0 1,25 
Other 0 @ @ • 0 @ 2,75 
Incentives used: FAP • • • • @ @ • • • • • • • @ • 13,5 LPS • 0 • @ • @ @ 4,75 Other @ @ 1 
-- : . 
FIRM 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
MOTIVE FOR LOCATION: 
FAP/LPS 5 1 6 4 5 6 5 3 5 
Local raw materials 6 5 6 
Political stability 6 4 6 5 5 3 6 6 4 4 6 
Liberal exchange controls 5 6 2 3 4 1 4 2 6 4 
Regional location 3 4 6 6 3 
Access to RSA market 4 5 4 2 5 1 2 
Low taxes 4 2 4 4 3 3 4 6 5 
Low labour costs 4 3 3 5 3 3 3 3 5 1 
Stable labour relations 2 5 1 3 2 3 5 5 2 3 
Economic climate 3 1 2 4 5 2 4 6 6 4 3 1 
Other 6 6 3 4 
OBSTACLES: 
High wages 1 3 
Low productivity 6 6 4 1 6 6 5 6 6 6 1 6 
High utility costs 3 4 1 6 4 5 5 3 3 5 5 5 5 3 5 
High input costs 5 4 5 5 2 2 5 4 3 4 
Lack of unskilled workers 4 3 5 4 5 6 6 4 2 4 
Lack of access to finance 6 6 4 4 2 
Lack of industrial land 2 4 3 
High transport costs 5 3 3 4 6 4 2 3 4 5 
Exchange rate 2 1 2 5+ 6+ 1 
Marketing 2 2 3 2 3 3 4 3 4 3 2 3 
Other 6 6 4 3 
NOTES: • feature is wholly applicable to company, @ feature is partly applicable, 0 feature is slightly applicable 
FBB is foreign expertise based in Botswana 
FBA is foreign expertise based abroad 
MBA is motswana based abroad 
!AOC is independent agent working on commission 
+ Weakening pula making raw materials expensive 
A= Pl00,000 - P900,000 
B = P900,000 - P2 million 
C = P2 million+ 
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